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    <title type="text">Edwards ESI, LLC  </title>
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    <updated>2025-11-11T09:57:04Z</updated>

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        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of Edwards Law Group LLC</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[Ethics and Drug Treatment]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2021/08/ethics-and-drug-treatment/" />
            <id>https://www.tdemadison.com/?p=46330</id>
            <updated>2024-07-16T15:43:04Z</updated>
            <published>2021-08-08T09:16:17Z</published>
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            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[AUTONOMY AND TWELVE STEP THERAPY: CAN THEY CO-EXIST? Timothy Edwards, B.A., J.D., L.L.M., S.J.D. INTRODUCTION Autonomy is a fundamental ethical right that allows mental health clients to make informed decisions regarding the course of their treatment. Legally speaking, autonomy is a liberty interest that is protected by the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution. Ethically speaking, autonomy underscores a number…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2021/08/ethics-and-drug-treatment/"><![CDATA[AUTONOMY AND TWELVE STEP THERAPY:
CAN THEY CO-EXIST?

Timothy Edwards, B.A., J.D., L.L.M., S.J.D.

INTRODUCTION

Autonomy is a fundamental ethical right that allows mental health clients to make informed decisions regarding the course of their treatment. Legally speaking, autonomy is a liberty interest that is protected by the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution. Ethically speaking, autonomy underscores a number of important client rights, such as informed consent, the right to refuse treatment and the right to confidentiality. Practically speaking, autonomy defines professional boundaries that separate intrusive institutional policies from the clients’ right to informed self-determination. At each level, autonomy is an indispensable ingredient in the appropriate treatment of addicted persons.

Realistically speaking, autonomy exists as a qualified right. For instance, institutional and therapeutic goals may limit the client’s right to self-determination. Obviously, clients do not have the freedom to engage in behavior that disrupts the orderly administration of treatment. For similar reasons, facilities may impose reasonable consequences in an attempt to correct self-destructive behavior. In these cases, where the claim to autonomy is outweighed by legitimate institutional goals, the resulting tension is resolved in favor of the facility.

Autonomy is influenced by other factors. Many clients enter residential treatment centers as the result of outside coercion, such as court action or employment demands. In these cases, the promise of autonomy is negated by circumstances that precede the client’s admission into the facility.

Incompetent clients, such as minors, do not enjoy wide ranging autonomy. Instead, the institution, and the therapist, have an affirmative duty to exercise reasonable supervision and control, as it is presumed that the client is incapable of making decisions for herself. These measures are legally and ethically proper.

Setting these cases aside, autonomy interests are often overlooked in the addictions treatment field. This is for a number of reasons that are unique to this profession. First, addictions treatment is the only profession where a substantial number of its workers are recovering from the very illness that they now treat. It is also the only profession where non-medical staff is encouraged to diagnose and treat an undetermined disease entity. Above all, addictions treatment is the only profession that draws heavily, if not exclusively, from spiritual and moral principles in its treatment of known medical disorders. These factors speak directly to the personal bias, competence and subjectivity of a unique professional enterprise- one that has historically given autonomy a low, and unenforced, ethical priority.

The relationship between the addictions counselor and the client is also unique. Unlike most professional relationships, addictions counselors often assume that clients are incapable of making important decisions in the most intimate areas of their lives. These counselors assume a paternalistic, active role in the client’s affairs, to the point that clients are actively discouraged from making decisions on their own. This questionable leap, from autonomy to paternalism, is justified by a common misperception among addictions counselors, namely, that addiction overrides the client’s ability to make decisions in her own best interest. According to one expert in the field: “Alcoholism and other chemical dependencies are characterized by denial and self-delusion. Initially, patients may be no more capable of making well-reasoned and informed judgments in their own behalf than small children … [T]he responsible therapist must accept that … a little bit of creative coercion and outside pressure is not entirely bad.” In other words, the unique status of addiction justifies the coercion and manipulation of persons who are otherwise legally competent.

This contention is patently false. Absent a finding of legal incompetence, addiction does not warrant intrusive intervention any more than other, comparable mental illnesses, such as depression. Thus, it is always unethical to manipulate, coerce or intimidate competent clients into complying with treatment that they find objectionable. Unfortunately, such ethical violations may be unavoidable in facilities that embrace the twelve steps, and the disease concept of addiction, as principle therapeutic tools.

A.A. IN THE INSTITUTION: A COLLISION OF VALUES

The traditions of Alcoholics Anonymous contain a strong commitment to non-professionalism and individual autonomy. Tradition six states that A.A. groups “ought never endorse, finance or lend the AA name to any related facility or outside enterprise.” Tradition eight reiterates this principle a bit differently: “Alcoholics Anonymous should remain forever non-professional…” In support of A.A.’s non-secular purpose, the second tradition states that “there is but one ultimate authority- a loving God as he may express himself in our group conscience.” By specifically rejecting the “counseling of alcoholics for fee or hire,” A.A.’s traditions incorporate autonomy, and equality, as guiding principles.  Treatment centers regularly violate these principles and nothing is done because they are not enforced.
…

Over the years, most residential treatment facilities have incorporated the teachings of Alcoholics Anonymous into their daily treatment plan. Most facilities host AA meetings, provide twelve step lectures and workshops and, most importantly, require their clients to complete a number of A.A.’s twelve steps as a prerequisite to graduation. The “language” of Alcoholics Anonymous is common parlance in these facilities, among both staff and clientele. It is fair to say that A.A.’s commitment to non-professionalism has been set aside in these facilities, where addicted clients are strongly encouraged to incorporate highly charged spiritual, and indeed, moral principles from AA into their daily lives. This forced marriage of A.A.’s guiding principles and professional authority is a combustible mix, one that A.A.’s founders were careful to avoid.

At the institutional level, mandatory A.A. participation raises serious questions. By definition, A.A. presents a recovery program that carries significant moral overtones. When A.A. participation is encouraged in the residential facility, these principles are fused with institutional and therapeutic authority that converts A.A. into a mandatory, rather than an elective, right of passage for the addicted client. In this process, intimate, religious-based absolutes are elevated into therapeutic standards that intrude on the client’s personal and religious autonomy. When combined with the disease concept of alcoholism, the impact on autonomy interests is prohibitive.

THE DISEASE CONCEPT AND THE ILLUSION OF METAPHOR

Many inpatient facilities rely heavily on the disease concept of addiction as a principle educational, and therapeutic, tool. The disease concept defines addiction as a medical illness that is categorized by mental obsession and a corresponding desire to use drugs despite adverse consequences. The disease model conceptualizes addiction in a simple, understandable manner- one that most addicted persons can identify with and understand. The disease concept also serves as a useful, therapeutic tool in that it places an intervening agent, the disease, between the addict and her addicted behavior. This reduces shame and guilt and, in turn, facilitates openness in the therapeutic exchange.

The disease model was designed to serve as an understandable description of the physical pathology of addiction. However, it was never intended to encompass thought processes or behavior that have no logical connection to the addictive process. Today, the disease concept has been cut far adrift from its moorings, and we see its usage everywhere; “You are in your disease.” “That is diseased thinking.” “Your disease is running circles around you.” This misuse of language attaches an undefined pathology to routine manifestations of resistance that should be expected, and indeed embraced, during the course of treatment. In this context, the disease concept serves as metaphor, and not fact, as the client is led to believe that an ever-changing disease process is in full control of his mental and emotional faculties. This questionable leap from biology to psychology minimizes the client’s self-confidence and invites questionable therapeutic intrusions into protected spheres of autonomy.

THE MANY FACES OF COERCION AND UNDUE INFLUENCE

With the backing of institutional sanctions, A.A. therapy and the disease concept provide fertile ground for systematic overreaching into important autonomy interests. Technically speaking, all autonomy violations occur through manipulation, coercion or undue influence. In each violation, a person with special knowledge and control will dominate the client’s will through various, improper means, such as deception or coercive persuasion. When this occurs, the client’s autonomy rights have been violated.

Similar practices are routinely applied in twelve step residential centers. Consider the following example:

William is a 19 year old male with a history of drinking problems. After a recent DUI, William’s probation officer told him that he would go to jail if he did not successfully complete an inpatient alcoholism program. William then admitted himself into a facility that boasted a “75% success rate” for graduating clients.

William’s attitude was poor. After failing to complete and present his “First Step,” William’s counselor confronted him in the group, informing William that his “best thinking” got him to treatment, that he was full of “self will” and that he was not “willing to go to any lengths” to get sober (all common AA sayings). When William resisted, he was told that he was “in his disease” and encouraged to “trust the process” without question. When William stated that he would not participate, his counselor threatened to contact his probation officer (an implied threat of incarceration).

The next day, William was called into the director’s office, along with two other counselors and two members of his group. The director, who had no clinical training whatsoever, reminded William that his probation officer would be contacted if he did not start “working on his recovery.” The other members of the group, and William’s counselor, told William that he was “in denial” and that he had to “surrender” by “turning his will over to the group” (all common AA sayings). William refused.

Two hours later, William was told to pack his bags and get off of the premises. The next day, the director of the facility called William’s probation officer, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. After learning that William consumed alcohol on the night of his discharge, the director informed his remaining clients that William’s “disease had got the best of him” because he was not ready to “go to any lengths” to find recovery.  To make matters worse, the facility encouraged William’s parents to cut off all financial and emotional support, leaving him alone and highly vulnerable at a critical point in his recovery.  (This type of manipulation serves more of a punitive than therapeutic function, and it can lead to relapse, suicide or both).

William’s story demonstrates how A.A. teachings and the disease concept are routinely misapplied in the residential treatment setting. It also illustrates how these principles create an atmosphere where the client is given no choice but to conform to the expectations of a unified group process. William’s counselor abused a position of trust and power by encouraging William to abdicate his own thought process (“your best thinking got you here”) and attacking routine manifestations of resistance (“you are in your disease”). By outnumbering William in the second “intervention,” the pressure intensified, as William’s counselor encouraged him to “surrender” his thought process and become “open and willing” to a recovery plan that was, by all accounts, mandatory. As William continued to resist, administrative pressure was brought to bear and William was literally forced to choose between treatment, jail and his family. These coercive measures so closely mirror cult indoctrination techniques that the comparison cannot be overlooked.

These dynamics play out in more subtle variations. In common treatment parlance, counselors and group members will tell a client that he is “in his disease,” “not willing to go to any lengths,” or “in denial” when routine manifestations of resistance surface. Group members employ similar language, hoping to gain the acceptance of the therapist by demonstrating the strength of their own recovery. But what does this accomplish? Doesn’t the misapplied application of these AA terms undermine the importance of autonomy and expose the professional limitations of the therapist? Again, the interplay between group therapy, where professional intervention is permitted, and an A.A. meeting, where it is not, creates a dangerous battleground where autonomy is reduced to a variable that the therapist can disregard when he subjectively determines that intervention is required.

TAKING INVENTORY IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS

A survey of available literature provides insight into therapeutic systems that invite impermissible intrusions into autonomy interests. Put simply, “unethical therapists minimize individuals’ competence to make decisions and encourage dependency on the therapy and the group.” As a result:

“Group dynamics are utilized to ensure that the private is made public. The leader and other group members expect total ‘openness’ or access into all parts of clients’ lives … This openness then leads to efforts to exert wide areas of control over the attitudes and behavior of members. Behavior that is not compliant is often viewed as resistant or a sign of character flaws. These behaviors are then targets of ‘therapy,’ with the goal being that the member would surrender the identified deviance and adhere to group norms.”

There are a number of common factors that present themselves in facilities that promote institutional, or therapeutic, goals over the client’s right to autonomy. Specific questions should include the following:

–  Does the facility use family members to manipulate the course of treatment through “tough love” or the pretense that withholding love or affection is a way to “take care of themselves?”

This is a common problem in addictions treatment and it literally destroys families, who should be invited into a respectful, honest dialogue with the client that includes authentic boundaries that are not imposed as a measure of control.  This should be obvious.
<ul>
 	<li>Does the facility “take all comers” and rarely refer clients to outside facilities?</li>
</ul>
Facilities, or therapists, that fail to acknowledge the limitations of their own practice often mislead prospective clients about their professional qualifications. By applying a “one size fits all” mentality to prospective admissions, these facilities are more likely to assign blame to clients who resist the moral tenor of mandatory participation in twelve step therapy. This dynamic is especially dangerous when the facility fails to diagnose underlying psychiatric disorders that are beyond the reach of traditional twelve step therapy.
<ul>
 	<li>Does the facility impose consequences against clients who resist therapy?</li>
</ul>
Rigid, twelve step facilities promote compliance over the honest expression of thought and feelings. Clients who resist are subject to group pressure and, often punishment. Often, those clients who fail to respond are blamed for their refusal to “surrender,” labeled as “toxic” and ostracized from the group.
<ul>
 	<li>Does the facility hire graduates of its own program as therapists or administrative aides?This practice, which raises concerns regarding dual relationships, reinforces the dominance of the group’s philosophy by closing the system off from outside sustenance. In turn, expressions of individuality among clients is met with resistance by employees who share a common vision of recovery. Facilities that employ a disproportionate number of AA members should be inventoried carefully to insure that personal bias does not override the client’s best interests.</li>
 	<li>Are financial relationships manipulated so as to discourage autonomy?</li>
</ul>
Many residential facilities require prepayment or otherwise bill for services that have not been delivered. Here, it is not uncommon for a client to held to a “contract,” signed on his first day at the facility, only to later learn that the facility will not return a portion, or all, of his money if he chooses to leave early. These practices prevent clients from exercising their right to refuse treatment without paying a tangible, financial price.
<ul>
 	<li>How is the client treated if he leaves the facility early?</li>
</ul>
In many cases, clients that leave a facility “against medical advice” are not permitted to contact remaining clients or, in some cases, their counselor. A halfway house in Northern Arizona “terminates” clients by giving them thirty minutes to leave or face arrest by the local police. These coercive practices place insurmountable pressure on the client, who is forced to choose between inappropriate therapy or potential homelessness.

· Are non-licensed administrative staff allowed to participate in the client’s therapeutic process?

In some facilities, there are no enforceable boundaries that prohibit administrators and non-clinical staff from intruding the clinical realm. Thus, many administrators and adjunct staff provide “treatment” that is derived solely from personal experience. By blurring the line between “twelve step work” and legitimate therapy, these individuals wield considerable influence in an area that they are not qualified to act.

CONCLUSION

Understandably, many addictions counselors feel a sense of urgency when dealing with a reluctant client. As with most serious mental disorders, addiction invites us to assume that the addicted client is incapable of making decisions for himself. This assumption, which places addicted clients on the same footing as legally incompetent persons, is insulting and clinically flawed. Once embraced, the counselor is tempted, and indeed permitted, to override the client’s thought process with his own therapeutic agenda. Once this assumption is discarded, as it should be, the client is invited to discard his mask of compliance, engage in authentic discourse, and explore legitimate recovery.

In any event, coercion and manipulation is not therapy. It is, instead, a complete breakdown of the therapeutic process- one that reflects the counselor’s inability to reach the client through conventional, ethical means.

Many counselors feel that autonomy is always intact because the client has the absolute right to leave the facility at any time. This is a fallacy. As noted above, most addicted clients enter treatment involuntarily. While the client is technically allowed to terminate treatment at any time, this decision can carry severe consequences, such as jail time, the loss of a job, or the loss of a professional license. This is particularly true when the counselor tells the client that early departure will result in inevitable relapse, or even death. It is thus incumbent on the facility, and the counselor, to extract themselves from policies that undermine the client’s qualified right to think and behave as an individual. In such facilities, the successful client will receive credit for his choices and, ultimately, his own individual vision of recovery.

. See, CHARLES BUFE, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, CULT OR CURE? 7 (Sharpe Press, Tucson, Arizona, 1995)(“…coerced individuals constitute a majority of those undergoing treatment …”)(emphasis in original).
. LECLAIR BISSELL &amp; JAMES ROYCE, ETHICS FOR ADDICTIONS PROFESSIONALS, 24 (Hazelden Press, 1994).
. PAUL ROMAN &amp; TERRY BLUM, NATIONAL TREATMENT CENTER STUDY REPORT 10 (Institute for Behavioral Research, 1997)(noting that over 93% of all treatment centers rely heavily on the twelve steps of Alcoholics Anonymous).
. Alcoholism has been characterized as a “disease that is characterized by abnormal alcohol-seeking behavior that leads to impaired control over drinking.” NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM, Alcohol and Health: Eighth Special Report to the U.S. Congress on Alcohol and Health (1993).
. Carole: I will forward you a complete citation for this proposition if you think it would be helpful. Just give me a call and I will go to the library and retrieve the source.
. KIM BOLAND &amp; GORDON LINDLOOM, Psychotherapy Cults: An Ethical Analysis, printed in 9 Cultic Studies Journal No. 2, 137, 141 (1992). Carole: The term “9 Cultic” is proper, legal citation format for this journal, indicating that this is Volume 9 of the “Cultic Studies Journal” (that’s the name of the Journal- it’s not an abbreviation).

&nbsp;]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of Edwards Law Group LLC</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[Spoliation of Electronic Evidence]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2020/12/spoliation-of-electronic-evidence/" />
            <id>https://www.tdemadison.com/?p=46327</id>
            <updated>2024-07-16T15:36:57Z</updated>
            <published>2020-12-30T10:16:17Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[Spoliation of Electronic Evidence]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2020/12/spoliation-of-electronic-evidence/"><![CDATA[<a href="https://www.tdemadison.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Spoliation-of-Electronic-Evidence.pdf" data-wpel-link="internal">Spoliation of Electronic Evidence</a>]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of Edwards Law Group LLC</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[Developing A Strong E-Discovery Plan]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2020/12/developing-a-strong-e-discovery-plan/" />
            <id>https://www.tdemadison.com/?p=46326</id>
            <updated>2024-07-16T15:38:44Z</updated>
            <published>2020-12-15T10:16:17Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[PLANNING FOR ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY IN THE DIGITAL AGE   Timothy Edwards, Esq.   Introduction.   Almost ten years ago, litigation attorneys sounded the alarm by predicting that litigation involving the disclosure of electronically stored information would engulf the discovery process, especially in complex cases.  Many Plaintiffs’ attorneys view electronic discovery as an opportunity to leverage settlement, and the lawsuit itself,…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2020/12/developing-a-strong-e-discovery-plan/"><![CDATA[PLANNING FOR ELECTRONIC

DISCOVERY IN THE DIGITAL AGE

&nbsp;

Timothy Edwards, Esq.

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Introduction.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

Almost ten years ago, litigation attorneys sounded the alarm by predicting that litigation involving the disclosure of electronically stored information would engulf the discovery process, especially in complex cases.  Many Plaintiffs’ attorneys view electronic discovery as an opportunity to leverage settlement, and the lawsuit itself, by seeking broad fields of electronic data at considerable cost to the Defense.  In response to these requests, Defense attorneys emphasize limited alternatives that often fail to produce meaningful, responsive information.

&nbsp;

As this cat and mouse game unfolded, parties often overlook the need for a coordinated electronic discovery plan that anticipates and solves problems in the e-discovery process.  This is a missed opportunity in which litigants failed to address critical issues, such as the early identification and preservation of potentially relevant electronic data and the authentication and admissibility of that data at trial.  Even today, many competent practitioners profess ignorance about these questions and openly admit that e-discovery is not a central consideration in most of their discovery plans.

&nbsp;

This Article will also propose a template for an electronic discovery plan that is suitable for Plaintiff and Defense lawyers.  By necessity, this Article emphasizes the need for early cooperation as a necessary component of an efficient electronic discovery plan, grounded in the meet and confer requirements in Wisconsin’s Rules of Civil Procedure.  From there, this Article will provide the template for an Electronic Discovery Plan for Plaintiffs and Defendants that insures compliance with existing discovery obligations and provides guidance for the discovery  electronic data in the ever-changing “digital age.”

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Introduction to ESI.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

In general terms, electronically stored information is nothing new.  Prior to their recent amendment, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplated that electronic data stored in a fixed tangible form was on equal footing with paper “documents.”  While the recent amendments confirm that electronic data is a “document” governed by the rules of discovery, this has never been an issue.<a href="#_edn1" name="_ednref1">[i]</a>  Instead, the question is how counsel adjusts her strategy to the unique technological features of electronically stored information. To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the life-cycle of electronic data during the litigation process:

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Identification of Data ——à</li>
 	<li>Preservation of Data ——-à</li>
 	<li>Discovery of Data ———-à</li>
 	<li>Processing Data ————-à</li>
 	<li>Form of Production ———à</li>
 	<li>Privilege and Clawback Agreements ——–à</li>
 	<li>Authenticating Data ————à</li>
 	<li>Admitting Data into Evidence ————à</li>
 	<li></li>
</ul>
These obligations are similar, if not identical, to the process that applies in the discovery of traditional, paper documents.  The difference rests in the complexity and expense involved in processing the information.  This Article will focus on a suggested plan that recognizes the unique technology that accompanies the discovery of electronic data.  In all cases, this process starts with the obligation to preserve electronically stored information through a properly drawn litigation hold.

&nbsp;

III.       The Identification and Preservation of Data:  Spoliation and the Litigation Hold.

&nbsp;

For years, Courts have recognized that a litigant has an affirmative duty to preserve potentially relevant information in anticipation of litigation or face sanctions for “spoliation” of evidence.<a href="#_edn2" name="_ednref2">[ii]</a>  This obligation applies equally to electronically stored information, which can be more difficult to identify and preserve due to the technology involved.  While Federal has not weighed in on this specific issue, the most reliable formulation of the duty to preserve is set forth below:

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>First, when litigation is reasonably anticipated or at the commencement of litigation, counsel must issue a “litigation hold” which should be periodically re-issued to keep it fresh in the minds of employees and to make new employees aware of it.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Second, counsel should identify the persons who are “likely to have relevant information” and communicate directly with these “key players” to ensure that they are aware of their duty to preserve relevant information. These “key players” are the persons identified in a party’s initial disclosures and any supplementation thereof.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Third, the court found that counsel have a duty to instruct all employees of their client to produce electronic copies of their relevant active files and to identify, segregate and safely store relevant backup tapes. The court went so far as to suggest that, in an appropriate case, counsel take physical custody of relevant backup tapes to safeguard the information.<a href="#_edn3" name="_ednref3">[iii]</a></li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

Preserving information relevant to a pending lawsuit is important for many reasons.  If a party fails to preserve evidence after litigation is reasonably anticipated, this failure can lead to serious punitive consequences for evidence “spoliation.”<a href="#_edn4" name="_ednref4">[iv]</a>  These consequences can include monetary sanctions, awards of attorney’s fees and costs for the price of investigating and litigating document destruction, and litigation consequences such as default judgments, dismissal of certain claims or defenses, or court instructions allowing a jury to draw adverse inferences about what destroyed evidence would have shown.<a href="#_edn5" name="_ednref5">[v]</a>

Preservation obligations for electronic data are no different than those that apply to traditional, paper documents, as the duty to avoid spoliation is well settled in the law.  The only difference is the procedures that must be followed due to the unique, transitory nature of electronically stored information, which can theoretically be destroyed with a push of a button.  This requires counsel to institute a litigation hold that identifies and preserves all relevant electronic data when litigation is reasonably foreseeable.<a href="#_edn6" name="_ednref6">[vi]</a> This raises questions regarding the timing of the obligation, its time frame and scope.  In many cases, the duty to preserve is triggered, but the time frame of the preservation obligation will go back many years and require the preservation of different sources of electronic data.<a href="#_edn7" name="_ednref7">[vii]</a>   Defense counsel, in particular, must be cognizant of this obligation and its nuances.

&nbsp;

Compliance with preservation obligations is a two-way street.  Plaintiffs often forget that they also maintain electronic records that could be relevant to the dispute.  At the beginning of the case, Plaintiff’s counsel must execute a litigation hold that identifies and preserves electronic data that is relevant to the claims and defenses of the case.  The litigation hold should be specifically crafted to the facts of the case by defining the case, identifying relevant information and explaining preservation obligations in some detail.  Counsel should take immediate steps to quarantine these records once litigation is foreseeable.

&nbsp;

Once the preservation obligation is satisfied for both Plaintiff and the Defense, each party should prepare and discuss a preservation agreement that is tied to a number of basic objectives including, but not limited to: (a) early identification of most likely sources of electronically stored information; (b) the continued preservation of electronically stored information pursuant to a  litigation hold that is properly executed and carefully documented.   This preservation plan can be negotiated before or during the meet and confer session, but it should be one of the first steps in the process if there is doubt about the preservation of electronic discovery.

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>The Meet And Confer Process.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

The meet and confer process is vital to a successful electronic discovery plan.<a href="#_edn8" name="_ednref8">[viii]</a>  A productive ESI discovery plan requires counsel to set aside the role of “zealous advocate” in favor of an exchange of information that accelerates the discovery process. It is a fool’s errand to bypass the opportunity presented by a robust meet and confer session in a case involving substantial electronic discovery.  This is an opportunity to learn about your opponent’s data systems, preservation efforts and the existence of litigation hold and document retention policies that might shape the e-discovery process.  If done properly, you have nothing to lose by participating in a meet and confer session in good faith.  The key is early planning and preparation.<a href="#_edn9" name="_ednref9">[ix]</a>

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Topics for the Meet and Confer.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

The topics for a meet and confer session should not be confined to those set forth in the FederalRules of Civil Procedure.  During the meet and confer conference, counsel should be prepared to address all of the issues referenced below:

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Processing and Form of Production.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>         Processing Data.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Document Review Protocol.  Manual or digital review for relevance, privilege and confidentiality.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Search terms:  Agreed upon process:  Search terms? Custodians?  Time-frames? Sources:  Databases? Unstructured data sources?  E-mail servers?  Legacy data?  Back up data?</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Form of Production: most common forms of production (pdf., native format, TIFF images), including disclosure of meta-data, deduplication obligations, production of structured data, production of inaccessible data, and bates stamping protocol;</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Negotiated Protections.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Disclosure of document retention plans and policies.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>2. The execution of documents that may be necessary to protect privileged information that is inadvertently disclosed during the litigation, including clawback agreements and privilege logs;</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>3. The use of a Protective Order to protect confidential information.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Efficient Use of Discovery Tools.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>The use of discovery tools to avoid cost shifting or resolve cost shifting issues;</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>The implementation of a discovery plan that authenticates electronically stored information, through proof or stipulation, and identifies those documents that the trial court must authenticate;</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Preparation for the Meet and Confer.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

In many cases, the results of the parties’ meet and confer could be scrutinized by the Court.  Here, a discovery plan is likely to be more persuasive if counsel can demonstrate that it is supported by actual facts regarding the information requested and the actual costs involved.<a href="#_edn10" name="_ednref10">[x]</a> Conclusory assertions that requested discovery is too burdensome are unlikely to prevail absent underlying facts.  To the extent possible, counsel should identify key custodians and consider the use of search terms to alleviate cost while maximizing the potential response to Plaintiff’s search.  Under all circumstances, preparation and good faith will position counsel to obtain as much discoverable information as possible.

&nbsp;

Defense counsel must be prepared to reveal his client’s preservation efforts at the meet and confer session.  In addition, Defense counsel should be prepared to identify legacy or back up data that is inaccessible to set the stage for cost shifting arguments as the case proceeds.  If possible, Defense counsel should have information about the cost and burden of searching these records, along with any other difficulties presented by the company’s computer system for search purposes.  If critical data is located in one of these repositories, the parties should attempt to negotiate a resolution of this dispute or agree to bring the matter to the Court’s attention.  Unlike the Plaintiff’s counsel, who should be prepared to demonstrate an efficient plan for obtaining ESI that will not cause an undue burden, it will be common for the Defense to explain expensive limitations in the Plaintiff’s electronic discovery plan to set the stage for further limits on discovery.  In preparing a proposal for discovery, Defense Counsel should consider:<a href="#_edn11" name="_ednref11">[xi]</a>

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>The volume of data reasonable to review in the time frame allotted by the Court and your client’s financial restrictions;</li>
 	<li>The number of (and sources) from whom your client may need to collect data if the Plaintiff issues broad discovery requests;</li>
 	<li>Arguments for limiting custodian list;</li>
 	<li>Methods for phasing discovery;</li>
 	<li>Methods for searching data, including date restrictions, search terms and other restrictions such as privilege;</li>
 	<li>The timing for exchange of privilege logs;</li>
</ul>
In many cases, the volume of data in the case may be appropriately limited with keyword or concept searches or a computer-assisted review tool.  Although often an effective means of identifying responsive documents and lessening the overall burden of the review, courts have recognized that the use of search terms can lead to under-inclusive or over-inclusive results and must be employed cautiously.<a href="#_edn12" name="_ednref12">[xii]</a> Courts have also begun to investigate and even endorse use of analytics technology to identify potentially relevant information – i.e., “predictive” or “automated” coding.<a href="#_edn13" name="_ednref13">[xiii]</a>

&nbsp;

Regardless of the tools used, it is important to interview custodians, reduce the number of custodians collected, and determine which core custodians’ data really must be collected and reviewed – whether it be by a computer or attorneys. If the collection is large and the discovery requests broad, any method used will be expensive, and the parties will need to focus on limiting the core data set collected.  Failure to obtain agreement with opposing counsel on the method by which data may be culled or, absent agreement, the failure to take reasonable steps to collect and produce core relevant data can lead to sanctions.<a href="#_edn14" name="_ednref14">[xiv]</a>

&nbsp;

The meet and confer process can be a lethal tool for a prepared lawyer with ESI experience.  Sometimes, opposing counsel will appear unprepared for the meet and confer process or otherwise refuse to participate in a good faith exchange of information.  Here, it is not uncommon for counsel to rely on assertions of privilege or conclusory allegations of undue burden in an effort to conceal their ignorance or avoid their meet and confer obligations.  Under these circumstances, counsel should file an immediate motion with the Court compelling good faith participation in the meet and confer process– a process that will now unfold under the supervision of the Court.<a href="#_edn15" name="_ednref15">[xv]</a>  If used properly, opposing counsel’s failure to participate in good faith can raise an early inference of bad faith that requires Court intervention, all to the Defendant’s detriment.

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Processing and Reviewing.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

Before producing records, Plaintiff must process the data that he seeks to preserve pursuant to his client’s ongoing litigation hold obligation.  The first step is locating the potentially responsive data and securing it for future use.  Depending on the volume, the next step is to review the document to determine whether it is privileged or contains confidential information that is governed by the Protective Order.  Once the privileged documents have been withheld and recorded on a privilege log, they should be set aside and preserved, as should the proprietary information that was produced and appropriately labeled pursuant to the Protective Order.  Finally, counsel should conduct a relevance review to determine whether certain documents are non-responsive or irrelevant to the case.  These documents should also be set aside, if necessary, for future use.

&nbsp;

The document process review can be much more onerous for Defense counsel, who often has access to more electronic data than the Plaintiff.  Depending on the size of the organization, processing ESI for an organization or entity can be a daunting task.  This is especially true at the early stages of the review process, where responsive documents are identified for production.

&nbsp;

Often, review tools are necessary because simply opening files one-by-one in their many different source applications is impractical, and may result in the destruction of metadata.  In these cases, it is necessary to load the ESI into a platform that is searchable and to apply a review tool that can perform a variety of functions, including file extraction, removal of system files and de-duplication.  After the relevant data set is culled from the original production set, search terms are applied and responsive documents are processed for final review in the agreed upon format.  This process will require the assistance of IT personnel or a qualified vendor.

&nbsp;

Proper documentation can protect the inadvertent disclosure of privileged information in certain instances.  Assume that Plaintiff’s counsel reviewed over 100,000 documents after filing a lawsuit against the disgruntled CEO.  By mistake, counsel disclosed a document in which his client made very damaging statements that directly impacted the strength of her case.  If the parties reach an agreement during their discovery plan that includes an order that protects against the waiver of privilege, it is possible to retrieve the document and preserve the privilege without further problem.<a href="#_edn16" name="_ednref16">[xvi]</a> To do so, the party must immediately give notice to the opposing party, in writing, that the document was produced inadvertently after reasonable steps were taken to prevent its disclosure.  At that time, Defense counsel must promptly return, sequester or destroy the document.

&nbsp;

Clawback provisions provide important protection against the waiver of the attorney client privilege that results from inadvertence due to the sheer volume of data involved.  They also demonstrate how advance planning, at the meet and confer stage, can avoid significant problems that result from the volume of data that is often reviewed in complex e-discovery cases.

&nbsp;

&nbsp;

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Form of Production.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

Production is the next step in the ESI life cycle after the information has been preserved, collected and processed.  The FederalRules of Civil Procedure provide a protocol for selecting the form of production, which begins at the meet and confer stage of the lawsuit.  Notably, the requesting party is allowed to request the form or forms in which ESI should be produced (usually in a searchable format).<a href="#_edn17" name="_ednref17">[xvii]</a> If the requesting party fails to request a form of production, or the responding party objects to the form requested, the responding party must state the form or forms it intends to use.<a href="#_edn18" name="_ednref18">[xviii]</a> Absent exceptional circumstances, Plaintiff’s counsel should insist that the documents are produced in a searchable native format, with meta data intact, which is likely to include savings in cost and time compared to other formats which require conversion of the ESI images into load files.  Questions regarding form of production should be addressed to a competent IT manager or third party vendor.

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Cost-Shifting Issues.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

One of the most litigated questions in cases involving electronic data is “who pays?”  In many cases, Defense counsel will argue that the discovery request is impermissible because it is overly broad, unduly burdensome or expensive.<a href="#_edn19" name="_ednref19">[xix]</a> In the ESI context, this is a short hand reference to “cost-shifting,” a concept which acknowledges that the cost of pursuing specifically identified electronic discovery far exceeds any benefit from the search.  In Wisconsin, the relevant factors to assess in determining whether cost shifting is appropriate are as follows:

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>The specificity of the discovery requests;</li>
 	<li>The quantity of information available from other and more easily accessed sources;</li>
 	<li>The failure to produce relevant information that seems likely to have existed but is no longer available on more easily accessed sources;</li>
 	<li>The likelihood of finding relevant, responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, more easily accessed sources;</li>
 	<li>Predictions as to the importance in usefulness of the information;</li>
 	<li>The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and</li>
 	<li>The parties’ resources.<a href="#_edn20" name="_ednref20">[xx]</a></li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

The effective use of discovery tools can avoid this debate.  In cases with significant electronic discovery, it is no longer appropriate to serve blanket discovery requests for electronic discovery that seek every imaginable document on a particular issue.  Targeted, specific discovery requests addressed at relevant documents material to the outcome of the litigation are much more defensible.  In some cases, the focus of these requests can be refined after taking the deposition of your opponent’s IT representative or third party vendor.

&nbsp;

In e-discovery, it is no longer proper to search for a needle in an electronic haystack.  The party seeking the information must specifically tailor his request to need, the likelihood of responsive information and the cost of production or be prepared to pay for what he is asking for.  The party who fails to comply with these directives will often be stuck footing the bill.

&nbsp;

&nbsp;

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Evidentiary Concerns.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

Given the complexity of ESI, it is easy to forget that the main goal of electronic discovery is to identify, secure and submit admissible evidence for consideration by the fact-finder.  Here, electronically stored information is different than traditional, documentary evidence in a number of important respects.<a href="#_edn21" name="_ednref21">[xxi]</a> A well planned electronic discovery plan should take these differences into account.

&nbsp;

Assuming that confidential and privileged information has been addressed through prior agreement, counsel must be prepared to authenticate electronically stored information.  This can be done through properly drafted Requests for Admissions pursuant to Rule 804.11 or witness testimony taken pursuant to a deposition.  Absent such proof, it can be very difficult to authenticate electronically stored information without specific proof that the evidence is what it is being offered for.  Unlike paper documents, which are fixed to a tangible medium of expression, electronically stored information reflects computer data that is routinely rearranged by the computer system in question, making it almost impossible to authenticate.  To overcome this hurdle, it is necessary to provide evidence of systemic safeguards within the computer itself (password access, hash tags, encryption) that identify the document as being what it is offered to prove.  Discovery should be focused on these key features of your opponent’s computer system when authentication is in doubt.

&nbsp;

Electronic discovery offers other evidentiary challenges.  While authentication is the most difficult, questions of relevance, undue prejudice and hearsay routinely surface in the admissibility of electronically stored information.  If necessary, a comprehensive e-discovery plan will anticipate these evidentiary arguments and lay the foundation for the admissibility of electronically stored information well before trial.

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Conclusion.</li>
</ul>
As this Article demonstrates, the principles that govern the discovery of electronically stored information are the same as traditional non-computer evidence.  The complexity of electronic data requires the parties to replace the adversarial approach to discovery with one of cooperation, transparency and common sense.  This approach saves money for the parties, avoids unnecessary discovery disputes and focuses the parties and the court on legitimate, contested issues surrounding the discovery of electronically stored information.  In all cases, these goals are advanced by a thoughtful discovery plan that flows from a thoughtful meet and confer process that is grounded in consensus and good faith.

&nbsp;

******

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1">[i]</a> Rule 34(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. and Advisory Committee Notes.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref2" name="_edn2">[ii]</a> Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)(“Zubulake IV”).

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref3" name="_edn3">[iii]</a> Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Zubulake V”); Edwards, Spoliation of Electronic Evidence, 2010 Wis. Lawyer 83, No. 11.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref4" name="_edn4">[iv]</a> Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001).

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref5" name="_edn5">[v]</a> See, e.g., Arista Records, LLC v. Tschirhart, 2006 WL 2728927 (W.D. Tex. 2006)(imposing a default judgment on defendant after finding that defendant used “wiping” software to erase data); Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Oracle Corp., 2008 WL 4093497 (N.D. Cal. 2008)(sanctioning defendant with adverse inference at trial); Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Lowry Dev., LLC, 2007 WL 4268776 (S.D. Miss. 2007)(reducing the plaintiff’s burden of proof as spoliation sanction against defendant).

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref6" name="_edn6">[vi]</a> See “Zubulake V” at 433.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref7" name="_edn7">[vii]</a> Pension Comm. Of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4546 at * 15.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref8" name="_edn8">[viii]</a> See Rule 26(b)(2)(c), Fed. R. Civ. P.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref9" name="_edn9">[ix]</a> Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83470 at *13 (D. Md. 2008).

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref10" name="_edn10">[x]</a> Helmert v. Butterball, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28964 (E.D. Ark, 2004).

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref11" name="_edn11">[xi]</a> Griset and Laws, Navigating a Case Through E-Discovery (McGuire Woods 2012).

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref12" name="_edn12">[xii]</a> Victor Stanley, 250 F.R.D. at 256-57.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref13" name="_edn13">[xiii]</a> National Day Laborer Organizing Network v. U.S. Immigration and Customers Enforcement Agency, 2012 WL 2878130, at *12 (S.D.N.Y., July 13, 2012).

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref14" name="_edn14">[xiv]</a> Jones, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51312 (N.D. Ill., May 25, 2010)(awarding monetary sanctions, imposing an adverse inference and requiring additional discovery).

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref15" name="_edn15">[xv]</a> See e.g., Kleen Products LLC, et al., v. Packaging Corp. of America, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139632 at *48 (N.D. Ill. 2012).

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref16" name="_edn16">[xvi]</a> See Rule 502, Wis. R. Evid.; Rule 502, Fed. R. Evid.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref17" name="_edn17">[xvii]</a> Rule 34(b)(2)(E), Fed. R. Civ. P.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref18" name="_edn18">[xviii]</a> Id.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref19" name="_edn19">[xix]</a>  See Rule 26(b)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref20" name="_edn20">[xx]</a> See Rule 26(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ. P; Edwards, E-Discovery: Who Pays? 2012 Wis. Lawyer 85, No. 10.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref21" name="_edn21">[xxi]</a> See Edwards, Getting Through the Door: The Admissibility of Electronically Store Information, 2014 Wis. Lawyer 87, No. 1.

&nbsp;]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of Edwards Law Group LLC</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[Ethics and ESI]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2020/11/ethics-and-esi/" />
            <id>https://www.tdemadison.com/?p=46328</id>
            <updated>2024-06-13T09:40:10Z</updated>
            <published>2020-11-24T10:16:17Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[ETHICS, PROFESSIONALIM AND ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY Introduction. As previous chapters of this book have shown, “technology has irrevocably changed and continues to alter the practice of law in fundamental ways.”[i]  As technology evolves, lawyers are confronted with new challenges pertaining to the preservation of data, the proper maintenance of privileged and confidential material and the sometimes daunting learning curve that accompanies…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2020/11/ethics-and-esi/"><![CDATA[ETHICS, PROFESSIONALIM AND ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
<ul>
 	<li>Introduction.</li>
</ul>
As previous chapters of this book have shown, “technology has irrevocably changed and continues to alter the practice of law in fundamental ways.”<a href="#_edn1" name="_ednref1">[i]</a>  As technology evolves, lawyers are confronted with new challenges pertaining to the preservation of data, the proper maintenance of privileged and confidential material and the sometimes daunting learning curve that accompanies new technological developments.  These developments present ethical challenges that require a reexamination of the duty of competence and a more careful view of the litigator’s responsibility with respect to confidential information and metadata that is produced electronically.  This chapter will briefly examine the parameters of the duty of competence in the e-discovery context and briefly outline the rules that delineate the proper and ethical management of confidential information.
<ul>
 	<li>The 2012 Amendments to the ABA Model Rules.</li>
</ul>
In August of 012, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 (the “20/20 Commission”) recommended, and the ABA House of Delegates adopted, updates to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility “to reflect the realities of the digital age.”<a href="#_edn2" name="_ednref2">[ii]</a>  These amendment reflect the inevitable reality that lawyers cannot rely entirely on others to understand technology that is utilized in the e-discovery process. Instead, lawyers practicing in the digital age have an ethical obligation to understand those aspects of technology that are relevant to the matters they handle and which are designed to protect confidential information.<a href="#_edn3" name="_ednref3">[iii]</a>
<ul>
 	<li>The Duty of Competence in the Digital Age.</li>
</ul>
The most significant change to the ABA Rules for the e-discovery attorney is found in the comments to Rule 1.1, pertaining to competence.  While the Rule itself remains unchanged, the new version of Comment 8 states s follows”

To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill a lawyer should keep abreast of changes to the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology, engaging in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal requirements to which a lawyer is subject.<a href="#_edn4" name="_ednref4">[iv]</a>

&nbsp;

Comment 8 was made explicit because of the rapid pace of technological change and the benefits and risks of certain technology.  Recognizing that an attorney has a “general ethical duty to remain competent in a digital aid, the 20/20 Commission explicitly acknowledged that electronic discovery fits within the broader of “relevant technology” contemplated by Rule 1.8:<a href="#_edn5" name="_ednref5">[v]</a>

Technology is also having a related impact on how lawyers conduct investigations, engage in legal research, advise their clients and conduct discovery.  These tasks now require lawyers to have a firm grasp on how electronic information is created, stored, and retrieved.  For example, lawyers need to know how to make and respond to electronic discovery requests and to advise their clients regarding electronic discovery obligations. …  These developments highlight the importance of keeping abreast of change in relevant technology in order to ensure that clients receive competent and efficient legal services.<a href="#_edn6" name="_ednref6">[vi]</a>

&nbsp;

While the comments to Rule 1.1 do not define the scope of “relevant technology” that falls under the purview of competence, counsel must, at minimum, understand the client’s information management systems, the tools used to preserve electronic data in advance of litigation, along with the software and hardware programs that are used to create, store, maintain, collect, process, review and process electronically stored information, including back up systems, search tools, predictive coding algorithms and, if necessary, forensic tools used to locate inaccessible, corrupt or lost data.  Counsel must remain current on technologies that create and process data as well as related tools that are used to preserve, process, review, search and produce such data.<a href="#_edn7" name="_ednref7">[vii]</a>   While the duty of competence requires lawyers to have a “firm grasp” on these technologies, the 20/@0 Commission also acknowledged that some matters “may require the use of technology that is beyond the scope of the lawyer’s expertise,” thus requiring the assistance of non-lawyers with more proficiency with certain technologies.<a href="#_edn8" name="_ednref8">[viii]</a>  Accordingly, counsel can satisfy the duty of competence by taking diligent and reasonable steps to understand the technology while using outside consultants when the technology requires special expertise.  The lawyer is not required to possess special training in these technologies to be considered competent.<a href="#_edn9" name="_ednref9">[ix]</a>
<ul>
 	<li>The Duty of Confidentiality.</li>
</ul>
The most significant substantive amendment to the ABA Model Rules addresses the duty of confidentiality.  Recognizing the differences between traditional lawyer client communications, which occurred by regular mail or facsimile, the drafters acknowledged that in contemporary communications, lawyers and clients routinely exchange computer information from many different sources that are sometimes accessible from many locations.  This has raised “new concerns” about “data security and lawyers’ ethical obligations to protect client confidences.”<a href="#_edn10" name="_ednref10">[x]</a>  Rule 1.6 has now been amended to “make clear that a lawyer has an ethical duty to take reasonable measures to protect a client’s confidential information from inadvertent disclosure, unauthorized disclosure and unauthorized access, regardless of the medium used.”<a href="#_edn11" name="_ednref11">[xi]</a>  To underscore the importance of this obligation, Rule 1.6 has now been amended to include specific language requiing a lawyer to make “reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of, or unauthorized access to information related to the representation of a client.”<a href="#_edn12" name="_ednref12">[xii]</a>

<a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1">[i]</a>[i]   ABA Commission on Ethics, Resolution 105A Report at 3 (August 2012).

<a href="#_ednref2" name="_edn2">[ii]</a>   ABA Commission on Ethics, Resolution 105A Report at 3 (“20/20 Report: Introduction and Overview”) (August 2012).

<a href="#_ednref3" name="_edn3">[iii]</a>   Kenney, The Evolving Ethics of E-Discovery:  Raising the Bar for Counsel  at 2 (Sidley Austin LLP 2013).

<a href="#_ednref4" name="_edn4">[iv]</a>   ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1, cmt. 8.

<a href="#_ednref5" name="_edn5">[v]</a>   20/20 Report:  Introduction and Overview, n.4, at p. 8.

<a href="#_ednref6" name="_edn6">[vi]</a>   Id. At p. 4.

<a href="#_ednref7" name="_edn7">[vii]</a> Kenney, The Evolving Ethics of E-Discovery:  Raising the Bar for Counsel  at 4 (Sidley Austin LLP 2013).

<a href="#_ednref8" name="_edn8">[viii]</a> 20/20 Report:  Introduction and Overview, n.4, at p. 5

<a href="#_ednref9" name="_edn9">[ix]</a> 20/20 Report:  Introduction and Overview, n.4, at p. 4.

<a href="#_ednref10" name="_edn10">[x]</a>   Id. at p. 8.

<a href="#_ednref11" name="_edn11">[xi]</a>   Id. at p. 8.

<a href="#_ednref12" name="_edn12">[xii]</a>  ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6.]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of Edwards Law Group LLC</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[The Admissibility of Electronically Stored Evidence]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2020/11/the-admissibility-of-electronically-stored-evidence/" />
            <id>https://www.tdemadison.com/?p=46333</id>
            <updated>2024-07-16T15:40:51Z</updated>
            <published>2020-11-20T10:16:17Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[THE ADMISSIBILITY OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE Timothy D. Edwards Edwards Law Group LLC In the past twelve years, the legal community has generated hundreds of articles and judicial decisions regarding the discovery of electronically stored information (“ESI”). Only recently, there has been an increased focus on the admissibility of the ESI, which can pose…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2020/11/the-admissibility-of-electronically-stored-evidence/"><![CDATA[THE ADMISSIBILITY OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION
UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

Timothy D. Edwards
Edwards Law Group LLC

In the past twelve years, the legal community has generated hundreds of articles and judicial decisions regarding the discovery of electronically stored information (“ESI”). Only recently, there has been an increased focus on the admissibility of the ESI, which can pose unique and difficult challenges. This article will provide a general framework for the admissibility of ESI under the Federal Rules of Evidence by addressing threshold questions of relevancy, authenticity and the application of the hearsay doctrine to computer systems.

As a preliminary matter, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to “electronically stored information” as they do to other types of evidence. FRE Rule 101(b)(6) provides that “a reference to any kind of written material or any other medium includes electronically stored information.” In addressing the authenticity of ESI, it is up to the court to make the preliminary decision on admissibility. The ultimate question as to the weight of the evidence, including its authenticity, is a question of fact, and up to the trier of fact to decide. In making its preliminary determination under Rule 104(a), the court is not bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence except those relating to privilege.

The admissibility of ESI is not governed by special rules. Instead, the admissibility of ESI is governed by existing evidentiary rules whose application will vary based upon the unique qualities of the information in question. These unique qualities can generate different foundational requirements for the admissibility of ESI through the application of existing rules of evidence.

The first step in understanding the admissibility of ESI requires a comparison of ESI to traditional paper documents. Years ago, the law looked to the “original” document, or a copy of that document, for proof of authenticity and, most case, admissibility. Unlike paper documents, which are defined by a permanent object, ESI is usually a collection of information that can be freely rearranged by different computer applications. These applications do not always contain complete or accurate information about earlier modifications or previous states of the information in question. This raises a critical distinction between ESI and paper documents for purposes of authentication: absent a physical object, such as a signed contract, the reliability of ESI depends on the examination of pure information, the integrity of the system in which it is stored, and the purpose for which it is offered.

Absent proof of fraud, courts traditionally accept paper documents once the basic foundational requirements for authentication have been met. This assumption does not necessarily apply to ESI because ESI is produced by systems that do not always contain information about previous versions of the author or the data, including reliable metadata. Because ESI is editable it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether ESI is what the proponent offers it to be. Systems edit documents routinely, as do humans, leaving no way to trace these changes, or completely verify whether a document is “original” in traditional terms. Absent proof of an “original,” the authentication of ESI will necessarily depend on other evidence, including circumstantial evidence that invites inferences about the reliability of the information and the integrity of the system that it came from.

The untestability of ESI presents challenging evidentiary problems. Instead of asking whether the information is in its original state, the proponent of ESI will necessarily focus on the process, or system’s integrity, to support a finding that the information has been maintained or preserved in its original state or some modification thereof. This requires consideration of the following evidentiary issues that typically surface when electronically stored information is offered into evidence: (1) relevance, (2) authenticity, (3) hearsay issues, (4) whether the best evidence rule applies, and (5) whether the probative value of the ESI is outweighed by considerations of unfair prejudice. Preliminary questions regarding the admissibility of electronically stored evidence, such as relevance, prejudicial impact, hearsay and authenticity, are governed by Rule 104 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

I. Authenticity

Evidence must be authenticated before it is admitted. To meet this standard, the proponent of the evidence must introduce evidence sufficient to support a finding that it is what the proponent claims it to be. “Authentication and identification represent a special aspect of relevancy . . . This requirement of showing authenticity or identity falls into the category of relevancy dependent upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact and is governed by the procedure set forth in Rule 104(b), Fed. R. Evid. This is commonly referred to as “laying a foundation.” To authenticate a document, its proponent must establish that the document is what it purports to be, and that there is a relationship between the document, and individual, and the issues of the case.

With ESI this hurdle appears to be insurmountable, as ESI can change over time without detection unless specific precautions are used. As a result, it is difficult, if not impossible, to literally “authenticate” an ESI document as an “original” with the same level of comfort one would have with a traditional, paper counterpart. The standard for authentication of ESI must take these factors into account by adopting a different test, with the same rule, which assures that the purported document is what its proponent says it is.

Thankfully, this test is not as difficult to satisfy as one might think. To authenticate ESI, its proponent must establish sufficient to support a finding that it has not been changed since it was originally created. Instead of focusing on whether the document is the “original,” this requires an inquiry into the reliability of the system that created the document and an analysis of circumstantial evidence, such as comparisons and other safeguards used to preserve the integrity of the information. Here, authenticity is defined by the integrity of the data, which supports a finding that the object has remained whole, or has stayed the same, since its creation.

There are various methods for testing the integrity of ESI. First, the proponent of the ESI can compare challenged information with information that is trusted, or has integrity. Circumstantial evidence of similarity between two sets of ESI can allow for an inference of integrity under the correct circumstances. Some computer users insure integrity by controlling when, and if, the information is edited (i.e., through “read only” applications). Finally, “HASH” techniques and encryption can be employed to preserve and test the integrity of information in a very reliable fashion. Of course, the integrity of information that is produced by these systems will depend on the integrity of the systems themselves. If they are modified or altered, the inference of integrity does not follow.

Understanding the difference between ESI and paper documents is only the first step in establishing the authenticity of ESI. Originality, now replaced with the principle of integrity, is no longer the starting point for assessing the authenticity of ESI. Instead, the proponent of the evidence must provide sufficient evidence to support a finding that the proposed ESI has not been changed since its original creation.

This can be done through direct or circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence would be testimony from the author of an e-mail who created the record. Circumstantial evidence would include a variety of information that raises a reasonable inference of authenticity, including metadata, hash values, encryption, time stamps or a proper chain of custody. As a reference point, Rule 901 provides a non-exclusive list identifying how extrinsic evidence can demonstrate authenticity that applies directly to ESI:

A. Authentication Through Extrinsic Evidence.

i. Testimony of witness with knowledge

ESI evidence can be authenticated through “[t]estimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be.” To satisify this standard, the witness must provide testimony that tends to establish the integrity of the document, i.e., that it has not been changed since its creation. For example, the witness can testify about the process by which the electronically stored information is created, acquired, maintained, and preserved without alteration or change, and the safeguards taken to preserve the authenticity of the information during the production phase. The witness need not have personal knowledge of the particular exhibit, so long as he or she has personal knowledge of how that exhibit is routinely made and why there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of integrity.

ii. Comparison by trier or expert witness

Under this rule, the proponent of the electronic evidence may provide testimony that compares the evidence with specimens that have previously been authenticated. This rule allows either expert opinion testimony to authenticate a questioned document by comparing it to one known to be authentic, or by permitting the fact finder to do so. E-mails, for example, can be authenticated under this test. Once a similar email has been authenticated and admitted, either through another evidentiary rule or by judicial notice, that email can be used as the basis for comparison, and a strong inference that the proposed email has not been changed since its creation.

iii. Distinctive characteristics and the like

This rule is the most frequently used to authenticate email. It provides that evidence can be authenticated through its “[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.” Distinctive characteristics in an email, such as the e-mail address or screen name of the person, help authenticate such evidence.

Further, “hash values” or “metadata” may be used to authenticate ESI. A hash value is a “unique numerical identifier that can be assigned to a file, a group of files, or a portion of a file, based on a standard mathematical algorithm applied to the characteristics of the data set.” This trait is used to guarantee the authenticity of an original data set and “can be used as a digital equivalent of the Bates stamp used in paper document production.” Other methods, such as encryption, or the use of digital signatures, can also establish the integrity of ESI.

iv. Public records or reports

Under this rule, extrinsic evidence can be used to authenticate documents where the evidence was “authorized by law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public office, or a purported public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, is from the public office where items of this nature are kept.” The proponent of the evidence needs to show that the office from which the records were taken is the legal custodian of records. This can be accomplished through testimony of an officer authorized to testify to the custodianship or through a certificate of authenticity from the public office. This test can be used to authenticate records such as, tax returns, military records, social security records, government agencies records, data compilations, which may include computer stored records.

v. Ancient documents or data compilations

This test permits authentication of documents if the evidence “[i]s in a condition that creates no suspicion concerning its authenticity; [w]as in a place where it, if authentic, would likely be; and [h]as been in existence 20 years or more at the time it is offered.” While this test may not apply now given its 20 year timeframe, it is important to note given its relation to the hearsay rule. If an ESI exhibit has been in existence for over 20 years, under Rule 901(8), such evidence can be authenticated. This method of authentication can qualify the exhibit under a corresponding hearsay exception, so that the exhibit may then be admitted for the truth of its contents.

Self-Authentication

The Federal Rules of Evidence also permit proponents of evidence to use self-authentication to admit evidence. While there are several categories that provide an efficient method for authenticating evidence, three are particularly relevant in the ESI context:

i. Official publications

“Books, pamphlets or other publications purporting to be issued by public authority” are self authenticating under Rule 902 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Thus, an e-mail, newsletter, or website published by a public authority can be self-authenticating.

ii. Trade inscriptions and the like

Evidence may be authenticated by “[i]nscriptions, signs, tags or labels purporting to have been affixed in the course of business and indicating ownership, control or origin.” Many business or trade communications, such as e-mails, contain information showing the origin of the transmission and identify the company. Such indicators may be sufficient to authenticate an e mail.

iii. Certified domestic records of regularly conducted activity

Rule 902(11) provides a method of self-authentication for records of regularly conducted activity. This rule mirrors the requirements of the business records hearsay exception to the hearsay rule. The authentication rule states that extrinsic evidence of authenticity is not required if the evidence is an “original or a duplicate of a domestic record of regularly conducted activity that would be admissible under [the business record hearsay exception] if accompanied by a written certification of its custodian or other qualified person.” The proponent must demonstrate that the person is familiar with and can certify “that the record was kept in the course of the regularly conducted activity” and “that the record was made of the regularly conducted activity as a regular practice.”

This method of self-authentication is important to ESI since most business records are now stored in electronic format. And, authenticating evidence in this manner may also admit the evidence for its truth because it qualifies under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. To support the admissibility of ESI under the business records exception, the proponent should demonstrate that the information was kept pursuant to regularly conducted business activity that would satisfy the business records to the hearsay rule and that the “business activity” in question insured the integrity of the information.

A. Hearsay

After the proponent of ESI establishes that the evidence is relevant and authentic, the proposed evidence must overcome any hearsay objections. With ESI, the main issue is whether electronic documents and writings constitute “statements” by a declarant within the meaning of Rule 801(a), Fed. R. Evid. A statement is “an oral or written assertion or … nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.” Hearsay is a “statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” A declarant is a “person who makes a statement.”

The application of the hearsay rule to ESI depends on whether the information a “person” has made the statement, i.e. whether the information is computer generated or “computer stored” (i.e., input by a person into the system). Often, computers generate metada that includes assertions. They also create “data sets” (i.e., information from a computer generated analysis), such as a breathalyzer result, results from a speed detection device, or information on an ATM receipt. While court are split as to whether computer generated information is hearsay, it is difficult to ignore the fact that a computer system often makes “statements” that could be offered to “prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Despite any ambivalence about whether ESI is “hearsay,” there is no doubt that computer stored information includes statements by people and systems that invite various exceptions to the hearsay rule if it is, in fact, applied. In the context of ESI, there are several exceptions that can be used to admit such evidence.

i. Present sense impression

This hearsay exception applies for a “statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.” Such statements are an exception to the hearsay rule because given the contemporaneous nature of the statement concerning the event; the dangers of a poor memory are minimized.

As it relates to ESI, this exception applies to statements made in emails or other human generated computer records. Even though such statements are in electronic form, the present sense impression exception applies the same way as traditional, hard copy formats. Further, social networking messages or posts may also qualify under this exception.

ii. Excited utterance

These statements relate to “a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” Like the present sense impression, such statements are considered trustworthy because statements made in an excited emotional state reduces the possibility of inaccurate statements. Therefore, electronic communications, such as e mails and social media postings can all be excited utterances as long as they were created under the stress of excitement caused by an event or condition.

iii. Then existing state of mind or condition

Similar to the previous two exceptions, statements “describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter” are admissible based upon the contemporaneous nature of the statements. And, like the previous two exceptions, e-mails and social media postings contain considerable amounts of these statements and are good examples for this exception.

iv. Business records

This hearsay exception is often discussed in conjunction with the authentication of certified domestic records of regularly conducted activity pursuant. These records include “memorand[a], report[s], record[s], or data compilation[s], in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge.” The records must be generated in “the course of a regularly conducted activity, as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness.” E-mails and computer generated records and documents may qualify under the business records exception, provided that they meet these requirements.

D. The Best Evidence Rule

After the proponent establishes that the evidence is relevant, authentic, and not hearsay, she still must overcome the best evidence rule. Under this rule, “[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording or photograph, the original writing, recording or photograph is required.” For electronically stored information, “original” means any printout—or other output readable by sight—if it accurately reflects the information.” This principle is confirmed by case law that consistently recognizes that “so long as it accurately reflects the data,” printout or duplicate copies of electronic evidence are admissible.

Proving that the document “accurately reflects the data” can be quite difficult given the malleable nature of ESI and the limited information provided by a mere copy of the most recent version. To overcome this obstacle, the proponent must establish that the information, or data, has not changed since it was first created. Absent such proof, the document does not “accurately reflect the data” that gave rise to its creation. Of course, these problems do not apply if the proponent of the evidence is only trying to establish that the proposed information is the most recent version of the document in question.

III. Conclusion

Electronic evidence poses interesting evidentiary challenges. Traditional rule applications such as relevancy and probative value apply to ESI just as they would if the evidence were in traditional, hard copy form. However, it is often difficult to authenticate ESI because of its dynamic and ever-changing format, requiring a new analysis that focuses on the reliability, or integrity, of the information instead of its originality. Once authenticated, the proponent of the ESI must determine whether computer stored information raises hearsay problems and, if so, whether an exception to the hearsay rule will allow the evidence to be admitted. Finally, the proponent of the evidence must satisfy the best evidence rule by showing that the document in question accurately reflects the “data,” which is established by showing that the information in the document has not changed since its creation. If these evidentiary foundations are overcome, the ESI should be admitted and the jury should decide its weight.]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of Edwards Law Group LLC</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[Electronic Discovery Planning]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2020/11/electronic-discovery-planning/" />
            <id>https://www.tdemadison.com/?p=46325</id>
            <updated>2024-07-16T15:41:44Z</updated>
            <published>2020-11-17T10:16:17Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[PLANNING FOR ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY IN THE DIGITAL AGE   Timothy Edwards, Esq. Introduction.   Almost ten years ago, litigation attorneys sounded the alarm by predicting that litigation involving the disclosure of electronically stored information would engulf the discovery process, especially in complex cases.  Many Plaintiffs’ attorneys view electronic discovery as an opportunity to leverage settlement, and the lawsuit itself, by…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2020/11/electronic-discovery-planning/"><![CDATA[PLANNING FOR ELECTRONIC

DISCOVERY IN THE DIGITAL AGE

&nbsp;

Timothy Edwards, Esq.
<ul>
 	<li>Introduction.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

Almost ten years ago, litigation attorneys sounded the alarm by predicting that litigation involving the disclosure of electronically stored information would engulf the discovery process, especially in complex cases.  Many Plaintiffs’ attorneys view electronic discovery as an opportunity to leverage settlement, and the lawsuit itself, by seeking broad fields of electronic data at considerable cost to the Defense.  In response to these requests, Defense attorneys emphasize limited alternatives that often fail to produce meaningful, responsive information.

&nbsp;

As this cat and mouse game unfolded, parties often overlook the need for a coordinated electronic discovery plan that anticipates and solves problems in the e-discovery process.  This is a missed opportunity in which litigants failed to address critical issues, such as the early identification and preservation of potentially relevant electronic data and the authentication and admissibility of that data at trial.  Even today, many competent practitioners profess ignorance about these questions and openly admit that e-discovery is not a central consideration in most of their discovery plans.

&nbsp;

This Article will also propose a template for an electronic discovery plan that is suitable for Plaintiff and Defense lawyers.  By necessity, this Article emphasizes the need for early cooperation as a necessary component of an efficient electronic discovery plan, grounded in the meet and confer requirements in Wisconsin’s Rules of Civil Procedure.  From there, this Article will provide the template for an Electronic Discovery Plan for Plaintiffs and Defendants that insures compliance with existing discovery obligations and provides guidance for the discovery  electronic data in the ever-changing “digital age.”

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Introduction to ESI.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

In general terms, electronically stored information is nothing new.  Prior to their recent amendment, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplated that electronic data stored in a fixed tangible form was on equal footing with paper “documents.”  While the recent amendments confirm that electronic data is a “document” governed by the rules of discovery, this has never been an issue.<a href="#_edn1" name="_ednref1">[i]</a>  Instead, the question is how counsel adjusts her strategy to the unique technological features of electronically stored information. To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the life-cycle of electronic data during the litigation process:

&nbsp;

&nbsp;

&nbsp;

&nbsp;

&nbsp;

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Identification of Data ——à</li>
 	<li>Preservation of Data ——-à</li>
 	<li>Discovery of Data ———-à</li>
 	<li>Processing Data ————-à</li>
 	<li>Form of Production ———à</li>
 	<li>Privilege and Clawback Agreements ——–à</li>
 	<li>Authenticating Data ————à</li>
 	<li>Admitting Data into Evidence ————à</li>
</ul>
These obligations are similar, if not identical, to the process that applies in the discovery of traditional, paper documents.  The difference rests in the complexity and expense involved in processing the information.  This Article will focus on a suggested plan that recognizes the unique technology that accompanies the discovery of electronic data.  In all cases, this process starts with the obligation to preserve electronically stored information through a properly drawn litigation hold.

&nbsp;

III.       The Identification and Preservation of Data:  Spoliation and the Litigation Hold.

&nbsp;

For years, Courts have recognized that a litigant has an affirmative duty to preserve potentially relevant information in anticipation of litigation or face sanctions for “spoliation” of evidence.<a href="#_edn2" name="_ednref2">[ii]</a>  This obligation applies equally to electronically stored information, which can be more difficult to identify and preserve due to the technology involved.  While Federal has not weighed in on this specific issue, the most reliable formulation of the duty to preserve is set forth below:

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>First, when litigation is reasonably anticipated or at the commencement of litigation, counsel must issue a “litigation hold” which should be periodically re-issued to keep it fresh in the minds of employees and to make new employees aware of it.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Second, counsel should identify the persons who are “likely to have relevant information” and communicate directly with these “key players” to ensure that they are aware of their duty to preserve relevant information. These “key players” are the persons identified in a party’s initial disclosures and any supplementation thereof.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Third, the court found that counsel have a duty to instruct all employees of their client to produce electronic copies of their relevant active files and to identify, segregate and safely store relevant backup tapes. The court went so far as to suggest that, in an appropriate case, counsel take physical custody of relevant backup tapes to safeguard the information.<a href="#_edn3" name="_ednref3">[iii]</a></li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

Preserving information relevant to a pending lawsuit is important for many reasons.  If a party fails to preserve evidence after litigation is reasonably anticipated, this failure can lead to serious punitive consequences for evidence “spoliation.”<a href="#_edn4" name="_ednref4">[iv]</a>  These consequences can include monetary sanctions, awards of attorney’s fees and costs for the price of investigating and litigating document destruction, and litigation consequences such as default judgments, dismissal of certain claims or defenses, or court instructions allowing a jury to draw adverse inferences about what destroyed evidence would have shown.<a href="#_edn5" name="_ednref5">[v]</a>

Preservation obligations for electronic data are no different than those that apply to traditional, paper documents, as the duty to avoid spoliation is well settled in the law.  The only difference is the procedures that must be followed due to the unique, transitory nature of electronically stored information, which can theoretically be destroyed with a push of a button.  This requires counsel to institute a litigation hold that identifies and preserves all relevant electronic data when litigation is reasonably foreseeable.<a href="#_edn6" name="_ednref6">[vi]</a> This raises questions regarding the timing of the obligation, its time frame and scope.  In many cases, the duty to preserve is triggered, but the time frame of the preservation obligation will go back many years and require the preservation of different sources of electronic data.<a href="#_edn7" name="_ednref7">[vii]</a>   Defense counsel, in particular, must be cognizant of this obligation and its nuances.

&nbsp;

Compliance with preservation obligations is a two-way street.  Plaintiffs often forget that they also maintain electronic records that could be relevant to the dispute.  At the beginning of the case, Plaintiff’s counsel must execute a litigation hold that identifies and preserves electronic data that is relevant to the claims and defenses of the case.  The litigation hold should be specifically crafted to the facts of the case by defining the case, identifying relevant information and explaining preservation obligations in some detail.  Counsel should take immediate steps to quarantine these records once litigation is foreseeable.

&nbsp;

Once the preservation obligation is satisfied for both Plaintiff and the Defense, each party should prepare and discuss a preservation agreement that is tied to a number of basic objectives including, but not limited to: (a) early identification of most likely sources of electronically stored information; (b) the continued preservation of electronically stored information pursuant to a  litigation hold that is properly executed and carefully documented.   This preservation plan can be negotiated before or during the meet and confer session, but it should be one of the first steps in the process if there is doubt about the preservation of electronic discovery.

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>The Meet And Confer Process.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

The meet and confer process is vital to a successful electronic discovery plan.<a href="#_edn8" name="_ednref8">[viii]</a>  A productive ESI discovery plan requires counsel to set aside the role of “zealous advocate” in favor of an exchange of information that accelerates the discovery process. It is a fool’s errand to bypass the opportunity presented by a robust meet and confer session in a case involving substantial electronic discovery.  This is an opportunity to learn about your opponent’s data systems, preservation efforts and the existence of litigation hold and document retention policies that might shape the e-discovery process.  If done properly, you have nothing to lose by participating in a meet and confer session in good faith.  The key is early planning and preparation.<a href="#_edn9" name="_ednref9">[ix]</a>

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Topics for the Meet and Confer.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

The topics for a meet and confer session should not be confined to those set forth in the FederalRules of Civil Procedure.  During the meet and confer conference, counsel should be prepared to address all of the issues referenced below:

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Processing and Form of Production.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>         Processing Data.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Document Review Protocol.  Manual or digital review for relevance, privilege and confidentiality.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Search terms:  Agreed upon process:  Search terms? Custodians?  Time-frames? Sources:  Databases? Unstructured data sources?  E-mail servers?  Legacy data?  Back up data?</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Form of Production: most common forms of production (pdf., native format, TIFF images), including disclosure of meta-data, deduplication obligations, production of structured data, production of inaccessible data, and bates stamping protocol;</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Negotiated Protections.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Disclosure of document retention plans and policies.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>2. The execution of documents that may be necessary to protect privileged information that is inadvertently disclosed during the litigation, including clawback agreements and privilege logs;</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>3. The use of a Protective Order to protect confidential information.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Efficient Use of Discovery Tools.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>The use of discovery tools to avoid cost shifting or resolve cost shifting issues;</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>The implementation of a discovery plan that authenticates electronically stored information, through proof or stipulation, and identifies those documents that the trial court must authenticate;</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Preparation for the Meet and Confer.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

In many cases, the results of the parties’ meet and confer could be scrutinized by the Court.  Here, a discovery plan is likely to be more persuasive if counsel can demonstrate that it is supported by actual facts regarding the information requested and the actual costs involved.<a href="#_edn10" name="_ednref10">[x]</a> Conclusory assertions that requested discovery is too burdensome are unlikely to prevail absent underlying facts.  To the extent possible, counsel should identify key custodians and consider the use of search terms to alleviate cost while maximizing the potential response to Plaintiff’s search.  Under all circumstances, preparation and good faith will position counsel to obtain as much discoverable information as possible.

&nbsp;

Defense counsel must be prepared to reveal his client’s preservation efforts at the meet and confer session.  In addition, Defense counsel should be prepared to identify legacy or back up data that is inaccessible to set the stage for cost shifting arguments as the case proceeds.  If possible, Defense counsel should have information about the cost and burden of searching these records, along with any other difficulties presented by the company’s computer system for search purposes.  If critical data is located in one of these repositories, the parties should attempt to negotiate a resolution of this dispute or agree to bring the matter to the Court’s attention.  Unlike the Plaintiff’s counsel, who should be prepared to demonstrate an efficient plan for obtaining ESI that will not cause an undue burden, it will be common for the Defense to explain expensive limitations in the Plaintiff’s electronic discovery plan to set the stage for further limits on discovery.  In preparing a proposal for discovery, Defense Counsel should consider:<a href="#_edn11" name="_ednref11">[xi]</a>

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>The volume of data reasonable to review in the time frame allotted by the Court and your client’s financial restrictions;</li>
 	<li>The number of (and sources) from whom your client may need to collect data if the Plaintiff issues broad discovery requests;</li>
 	<li>Arguments for limiting custodian list;</li>
 	<li>Methods for phasing discovery;</li>
 	<li>Methods for searching data, including date restrictions, search terms and other restrictions such as privilege;</li>
 	<li>The timing for exchange of privilege logs;</li>
</ul>
In many cases, the volume of data in the case may be appropriately limited with keyword or concept searches or a computer-assisted review tool.  Although often an effective means of identifying responsive documents and lessening the overall burden of the review, courts have recognized that the use of search terms can lead to under-inclusive or over-inclusive results and must be employed cautiously.<a href="#_edn12" name="_ednref12">[xii]</a> Courts have also begun to investigate and even endorse use of analytics technology to identify potentially relevant information – i.e., “predictive” or “automated” coding.<a href="#_edn13" name="_ednref13">[xiii]</a>

&nbsp;

Regardless of the tools used, it is important to interview custodians, reduce the number of custodians collected, and determine which core custodians’ data really must be collected and reviewed – whether it be by a computer or attorneys. If the collection is large and the discovery requests broad, any method used will be expensive, and the parties will need to focus on limiting the core data set collected.  Failure to obtain agreement with opposing counsel on the method by which data may be culled or, absent agreement, the failure to take reasonable steps to collect and produce core relevant data can lead to sanctions.<a href="#_edn14" name="_ednref14">[xiv]</a>

&nbsp;

The meet and confer process can be a lethal tool for a prepared lawyer with ESI experience.  Sometimes, opposing counsel will appear unprepared for the meet and confer process or otherwise refuse to participate in a good faith exchange of information.  Here, it is not uncommon for counsel to rely on assertions of privilege or conclusory allegations of undue burden in an effort to conceal their ignorance or avoid their meet and confer obligations.  Under these circumstances, counsel should file an immediate motion with the Court compelling good faith participation in the meet and confer process– a process that will now unfold under the supervision of the Court.<a href="#_edn15" name="_ednref15">[xv]</a>  If used properly, opposing counsel’s failure to participate in good faith can raise an early inference of bad faith that requires Court intervention, all to the Defendant’s detriment.

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Processing and Reviewing.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

Before producing records, Plaintiff must process the data that he seeks to preserve pursuant to his client’s ongoing litigation hold obligation.  The first step is locating the potentially responsive data and securing it for future use.  Depending on the volume, the next step is to review the document to determine whether it is privileged or contains confidential information that is governed by the Protective Order.  Once the privileged documents have been withheld and recorded on a privilege log, they should be set aside and preserved, as should the proprietary information that was produced and appropriately labeled pursuant to the Protective Order.  Finally, counsel should conduct a relevance review to determine whether certain documents are non-responsive or irrelevant to the case.  These documents should also be set aside, if necessary, for future use.

&nbsp;

The document process review can be much more onerous for Defense counsel, who often has access to more electronic data than the Plaintiff.  Depending on the size of the organization, processing ESI for an organization or entity can be a daunting task.  This is especially true at the early stages of the review process, where responsive documents are identified for production.

&nbsp;

Often, review tools are necessary because simply opening files one-by-one in their many different source applications is impractical, and may result in the destruction of metadata.  In these cases, it is necessary to load the ESI into a platform that is searchable and to apply a review tool that can perform a variety of functions, including file extraction, removal of system files and de-duplication.  After the relevant data set is culled from the original production set, search terms are applied and responsive documents are processed for final review in the agreed upon format.  This process will require the assistance of IT personnel or a qualified vendor.

&nbsp;

Proper documentation can protect the inadvertent disclosure of privileged information in certain instances.  Assume that Plaintiff’s counsel reviewed over 100,000 documents after filing a lawsuit against the disgruntled CEO.  By mistake, counsel disclosed a document in which his client made very damaging statements that directly impacted the strength of her case.  If the parties reach an agreement during their discovery plan that includes an order that protects against the waiver of privilege, it is possible to retrieve the document and preserve the privilege without further problem.<a href="#_edn16" name="_ednref16">[xvi]</a> To do so, the party must immediately give notice to the opposing party, in writing, that the document was produced inadvertently after reasonable steps were taken to prevent its disclosure.  At that time, Defense counsel must promptly return, sequester or destroy the document.

&nbsp;

Clawback provisions provide important protection against the waiver of the attorney client privilege that results from inadvertence due to the sheer volume of data involved.  They also demonstrate how advance planning, at the meet and confer stage, can avoid significant problems that result from the volume of data that is often reviewed in complex e-discovery cases.

&nbsp;

&nbsp;

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Form of Production.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

Production is the next step in the ESI life cycle after the information has been preserved, collected and processed.  The FederalRules of Civil Procedure provide a protocol for selecting the form of production, which begins at the meet and confer stage of the lawsuit.  Notably, the requesting party is allowed to request the form or forms in which ESI should be produced (usually in a searchable format).<a href="#_edn17" name="_ednref17">[xvii]</a> If the requesting party fails to request a form of production, or the responding party objects to the form requested, the responding party must state the form or forms it intends to use.<a href="#_edn18" name="_ednref18">[xviii]</a> Absent exceptional circumstances, Plaintiff’s counsel should insist that the documents are produced in a searchable native format, with meta data intact, which is likely to include savings in cost and time compared to other formats which require conversion of the ESI images into load files.  Questions regarding form of production should be addressed to a competent IT manager or third party vendor.

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Cost-Shifting Issues.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

One of the most litigated questions in cases involving electronic data is “who pays?”  In many cases, Defense counsel will argue that the discovery request is impermissible because it is overly broad, unduly burdensome or expensive.<a href="#_edn19" name="_ednref19">[xix]</a> In the ESI context, this is a short hand reference to “cost-shifting,” a concept which acknowledges that the cost of pursuing specifically identified electronic discovery far exceeds any benefit from the search.  In Wisconsin, the relevant factors to assess in determining whether cost shifting is appropriate are as follows:

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>The specificity of the discovery requests;</li>
 	<li>The quantity of information available from other and more easily accessed sources;</li>
 	<li>The failure to produce relevant information that seems likely to have existed but is no longer available on more easily accessed sources;</li>
 	<li>The likelihood of finding relevant, responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, more easily accessed sources;</li>
 	<li>Predictions as to the importance in usefulness of the information;</li>
 	<li>The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and</li>
 	<li>The parties’ resources.<a href="#_edn20" name="_ednref20">[xx]</a></li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

The effective use of discovery tools can avoid this debate.  In cases with significant electronic discovery, it is no longer appropriate to serve blanket discovery requests for electronic discovery that seek every imaginable document on a particular issue.  Targeted, specific discovery requests addressed at relevant documents material to the outcome of the litigation are much more defensible.  In some cases, the focus of these requests can be refined after taking the deposition of your opponent’s IT representative or third party vendor.

&nbsp;

In e-discovery, it is no longer proper to search for a needle in an electronic haystack.  The party seeking the information must specifically tailor his request to need, the likelihood of responsive information and the cost of production or be prepared to pay for what he is asking for.  The party who fails to comply with these directives will often be stuck footing the bill.

&nbsp;

&nbsp;

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Evidentiary Concerns.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

Given the complexity of ESI, it is easy to forget that the main goal of electronic discovery is to identify, secure and submit admissible evidence for consideration by the fact-finder.  Here, electronically stored information is different than traditional, documentary evidence in a number of important respects.<a href="#_edn21" name="_ednref21">[xxi]</a> A well planned electronic discovery plan should take these differences into account.

&nbsp;

Assuming that confidential and privileged information has been addressed through prior agreement, counsel must be prepared to authenticate electronically stored information.  This can be done through properly drafted Requests for Admissions pursuant to Rule 804.11 or witness testimony taken pursuant to a deposition.  Absent such proof, it can be very difficult to authenticate electronically stored information without specific proof that the evidence is what it is being offered for.  Unlike paper documents, which are fixed to a tangible medium of expression, electronically stored information reflects computer data that is routinely rearranged by the computer system in question, making it almost impossible to authenticate.  To overcome this hurdle, it is necessary to provide evidence of systemic safeguards within the computer itself (password access, hash tags, encryption) that identify the document as being what it is offered to prove.  Discovery should be focused on these key features of your opponent’s computer system when authentication is in doubt.

&nbsp;

Electronic discovery offers other evidentiary challenges.  While authentication is the most difficult, questions of relevance, undue prejudice and hearsay routinely surface in the admissibility of electronically stored information.  If necessary, a comprehensive e-discovery plan will anticipate these evidentiary arguments and lay the foundation for the admissibility of electronically stored information well before trial.

&nbsp;
<ul>
 	<li>Conclusion.</li>
</ul>
As this Article demonstrates, the principles that govern the discovery of electronically stored information are the same as traditional non-computer evidence.  The complexity of electronic data requires the parties to replace the adversarial approach to discovery with one of cooperation, transparency and common sense.  This approach saves money for the parties, avoids unnecessary discovery disputes and focuses the parties and the court on legitimate, contested issues surrounding the discovery of electronically stored information.  In all cases, these goals are advanced by a thoughtful discovery plan that flows from a thoughtful meet and confer process that is grounded in consensus and good faith.

&nbsp;

******

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1">[i]</a> Rule 34(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. and Advisory Committee Notes.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref2" name="_edn2">[ii]</a> Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)(“Zubulake IV”).

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref3" name="_edn3">[iii]</a> Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Zubulake V”); Edwards, Spoliation of Electronic Evidence, 2010 Wis. Lawyer 83, No. 11.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref4" name="_edn4">[iv]</a> Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001).

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref5" name="_edn5">[v]</a> See, e.g., Arista Records, LLC v. Tschirhart, 2006 WL 2728927 (W.D. Tex. 2006)(imposing a default judgment on defendant after finding that defendant used “wiping” software to erase data); Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Oracle Corp., 2008 WL 4093497 (N.D. Cal. 2008)(sanctioning defendant with adverse inference at trial); Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Lowry Dev., LLC, 2007 WL 4268776 (S.D. Miss. 2007)(reducing the plaintiff’s burden of proof as spoliation sanction against defendant).

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref6" name="_edn6">[vi]</a> See “Zubulake V” at 433.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref7" name="_edn7">[vii]</a> Pension Comm. Of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4546 at * 15.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref8" name="_edn8">[viii]</a> See Rule 26(b)(2)(c), Fed. R. Civ. P.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref9" name="_edn9">[ix]</a> Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83470 at *13 (D. Md. 2008).

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref10" name="_edn10">[x]</a> Helmert v. Butterball, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28964 (E.D. Ark, 2004).

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref11" name="_edn11">[xi]</a> Griset and Laws, Navigating a Case Through E-Discovery (McGuire Woods 2012).

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref12" name="_edn12">[xii]</a> Victor Stanley, 250 F.R.D. at 256-57.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref13" name="_edn13">[xiii]</a> National Day Laborer Organizing Network v. U.S. Immigration and Customers Enforcement Agency, 2012 WL 2878130, at *12 (S.D.N.Y., July 13, 2012).

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref14" name="_edn14">[xiv]</a> Jones, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51312 (N.D. Ill., May 25, 2010)(awarding monetary sanctions, imposing an adverse inference and requiring additional discovery).

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref15" name="_edn15">[xv]</a> See e.g., Kleen Products LLC, et al., v. Packaging Corp. of America, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139632 at *48 (N.D. Ill. 2012).

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref16" name="_edn16">[xvi]</a> See Rule 502, Wis. R. Evid.; Rule 502, Fed. R. Evid.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref17" name="_edn17">[xvii]</a> Rule 34(b)(2)(E), Fed. R. Civ. P.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref18" name="_edn18">[xviii]</a> Id.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref19" name="_edn19">[xix]</a>  See Rule 26(b)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref20" name="_edn20">[xx]</a> See Rule 26(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ. P; Edwards, E-Discovery: Who Pays? 2012 Wis. Lawyer 85, No. 10.

&nbsp;

<a href="#_ednref21" name="_edn21">[xxi]</a> See Edwards, Getting Through the Door: The Admissibility of Electronically Store Information, 2014 Wis. Lawyer 87, No. 1.

&nbsp;]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of Edwards Law Group LLC</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[Addiction and Attorneys]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2020/11/addiction-and-attorneys/" />
            <id>https://www.tdemadison.com/?p=46331</id>
            <updated>2024-07-16T15:44:08Z</updated>
            <published>2020-11-17T10:16:17Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[Aug. 2007 – Addiction and Attorneys]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2020/11/addiction-and-attorneys/"><![CDATA[<a href="https://www.tdemadison.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Aug.-2007-Addiction-and-Attorneys.pdf" data-wpel-link="internal">Aug. 2007 – Addiction and Attorneys</a>]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of Edwards Law Group LLC</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[Overview of the FMLA]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2020/11/overview-of-the-fmla/" />
            <id>https://www.tdemadison.com/?p=46329</id>
            <updated>2024-07-16T15:46:34Z</updated>
            <published>2020-11-16T10:16:17Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[Here are the basics of the FMLA: Overview of The Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) The Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) provides certain employees with up to 12 workweeks of unpaid, job-protected leave a year, and requires group health benefits to be maintained during the leave as if employees continued to work instead of taking leave. The FMLA…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2020/11/overview-of-the-fmla/"><![CDATA[Here are the basics of the FMLA:

Overview of The Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)

The Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) provides certain employees with up to 12 workweeks of unpaid, job-protected leave a year, and requires group health benefits to be maintained during the leave as if employees continued to work instead of taking leave. The FMLA became effective August 5, 1993, for most employers and employees. (For those covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in effect on that date, the FMLA became effective on the expiration of the CBA or February 5, 1994, whichever was earlier.)

This law covers only certain employers; affects only those employees eligible for the protections of the law; involves entitlement to leave, maintenance of health benefits during leave, and job restoration after leave; sets requirements for notice and certification of the need for FMLA leave; and protects employees who request or take FMLA leave. The law also includes certain employer recordkeeping requirements.

The FMLA allows employees to balance their work and family life by taking reasonable unpaid leave for certain family and medical reasons. The FMLA seeks to accomplish these purposes in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers, and minimizes the potential for employment discrimination on the basis of gender, while promoting equal employment opportunity for men and women.
Employer Coverage

The FMLA applies to all:
• public agencies, including State, local and Federal employers, and local education agencies (schools); and,
• private sector employers who employ 50 or more employees for at least 20 workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year – including joint employers and successors of covered employers.
For FMLA purposes, most Federal and Congressional employees are under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) or the Congress.
Employee Eligibility

To be eligible for FMLA leave, an employee must work for a covered employer and:
• have worked for that employer for at least 12 months; and
• have worked at least 1,250 hours during the 12 months prior to the start of the FMLA leave; and,
• work at a location where at least 50 employees are employed at the location or within 75 miles of the location.
Leave Entitlement
A covered employer must grant an eligible employee up to a total of 12 workweeks of unpaid leave in a 12 month period for one or more of the following reasons:
• for the birth of a son or daughter, and to care for the newborn child;
• for the placement with the employee of a child for adoption or foster care, and to care for the newly placed child;
• to care for an immediate family member (spouse, child, or parent — but not a parent “in-law”) with a serious health condition; and
• when the employee is unable to work because of a serious health condition.
Leave to care for a newborn child or for a newly placed child must conclude within 12 months after the birth or placement. (See CFR Section 825.201)
Spouses employed by the same employer may be limited to a combined total of 12 workweeks of family leave for the following reasons:
• birth and care of a child;
• for the placement of a child for adoption or foster care, and to care for the newly placed child; and,
• to care for an employee’s parent who has a serious health condition.
Intermittent/Reduced Schedule Leave
The FMLA permits employees to take leave on an intermittent basis or to work a reduced schedule under certain circumstances. CFR Section 203)
• Intermittent/reduced schedule leave may be taken when medically necessary to care for a seriously ill family member, or because of the employee’s serious health condition.
• Intermittent/reduced schedule leave may be taken to care for a newborn or newly placed adopted or foster care child only with the employer’s approval.
Only the amount of leave actually taken while on intermittent/reduced schedule leave may be charged as FMLA leave. Employees may not be required to take more FMLA leave than necessary to address the circumstances that cause the need for leave. Employers may account for FMLA leave in the shortest period of time that their payroll systems use, provided it is one hour or less. (See CFR Section 825-205)
Employees needing intermittent/reduced schedule leave for foreseeable medical treatment must work with their employers to schedule the leave so as not to unduly disrupt the employer’s operations, subject to the approval of the employee’s health care provider. In such cases, the employer may transfer the employee temporarily to an alternative job with equivalent pay and benefits that accommodates recurring periods of leave better than the employee’s regular job.
Substitution of Paid Leave
Employees may choose to use, or employers may require the employee to use, accrued paid leave to cover some or all of the FMLA leave taken. Employees may choose, or employers may require, the substitution of accrued paid vacation or personal leave for any of the situations covered by FMLA. The substitution of accrued sick or family leave is limited by the employer’s policies governing the use of such leave.
Serious Health Condition
“Serious health condition” means an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves:
• any period of incapacity or treatment connected with inpatient care (i.e., an overnight stay) in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or
• a period of incapacity requiring absence of more than three calendar days from work, school, or other regular daily activities that also involves continuing treatment by (or under the supervision of) a health care provider; or
• any period of incapacity due to pregnancy, or for prenatal care; or
• any period of incapacity (or treatment therefore) due to a chronic serious health condition (e.g., asthma, diabetes, epilepsy, etc.); or
• a period of incapacity that is permanent or long-term due to a condition for which treatment may not be effective (e.g., Alzheimer’s, stroke, terminal diseases, etc.); or,
• any absences to receive multiple treatments (including any period of recovery therefrom) by, or on referral by, a health care provider for a condition that likely would result in incapacity of more than three consecutive days if left untreated (e.g., chemotherapy, physical therapy, dialysis, etc.).
Medical Certification
An employer may require that the need for leave for a serious health condition of the employee or the employee’s immediate family member be supported by a certification issued by a health care provider. The employer must allow the employee at least 15 calendar days to obtain the medical certification.
An employer may, at its own expense, require the employee to obtain a second medical certification from a health care provider. The employer may choose the health care provider for the second opinion, except that in most cases the employer may not regularly contract with or otherwise regularly use the services of the health care provider. If the opinions of the employee’s and the employer’s designated health care providers differ, the employer may require the employee to obtain certification from a third health care provider, again at the employer’s expense. This third opinion shall be final and binding. The third health care provider must be approved jointly by the employer and the employee. The “Certification of Health Care Provider” (optional form WH-380)
Health Care Provider
Health care providers who may provide certification of a serious health condition include:
• doctors of medicine or osteopathy authorized to practice medicine or surgery (as appropriate) by the State in which the doctor practices;
• podiatrists, dentists, clinical psychologists, optometrists, and chiropractors (limited to treatment consisting of manual manipulation of the spine to correct a subluxation as demonstrated by X-ray to exist) authorized to practice in the State and performing within the scope of their practice under State law;
• nurse practitioners, nurse-midwives, and clinical social workers authorized to practice under State law and performing within the scope of their practice as defined under State law;
• Christian Science practitioners listed with the First Church of Christ, Scientist in Boston, Massachusetts;
• any health care provider recognized by the employer or the employer’s group health plan’s benefits manager; and,
• a health care provider listed above who practices in a country other than the United States and who is authorized to practice under the laws of that country.
Maintenance of Health Benefits
A covered employer is required to maintain group health insurance coverage, including family coverage, for an employee on FMLA leave on the same terms as if the employee continued to work.
Where appropriate, arrangements will need to be made for employees taking unpaid FMLA leave to pay their share of health insurance premiums. For example, if the group health plan involves co-payments by the employer and the employee, an employee on unpaid FMLA leave must make arrangements to pay his or her normal portion of the insurance premiums to maintain insurance coverage, as must the employer. Such payments may be made under any arrangement voluntarily agreed to by the employer and employee.
An employer’s obligation to maintain health benefits under FMLA stops if and when an employee informs the employer of an intent not to return to work at the end of the leave period, or if the employee fails to return to work when the FMLA leave entitlement is exhausted. The employer’s obligation also stops if the employee’s premium payment is more than 30 days late and the employer has given the employee written notice at least 15 days in advance advising that coverage will cease if payment is not received.
In some circumstances, the employer may recover premiums it paid to maintain health insurance coverage for an employee who fails to return to work from FMLA leave.
Other Benefits
Other benefits, including cash payments chosen by the employee instead of group health insurance coverage, need not be maintained during periods of unpaid FMLA leave.
Certain types of earned benefits, such as seniority or paid leave, need not continue to accrue during periods of unpaid FMLA leave provided that such benefits do not accrue for employees on other types of unpaid leave. For other benefits, such as elected life insurance coverage, the employer and the employee may make arrangements to continue benefits during periods of unpaid FMLA leave. An employer may elect to continue such benefits to ensure that the employee will be eligible to be restored to the same benefits upon returning to work. At the conclusion of the leave, the employer may recover only the employee’s share of premiums it paid to maintain other “non-health” benefits during unpaid FMLA leave.
Job Restoration
Upon return from FMLA leave, an employee must be restored to his or her original job, or to an “equivalent” job, which means virtually identical to the original job in terms of pay, benefits, and other employment terms and conditions.
In addition, an employee’s use of FMLA leave cannot result in the loss of any employment benefit that the employee earned or was entitled to before using (but not necessarily during) FMLA leave.
“Key” Employee Exception
Under limited circumstances where restoration to employment will cause “substantial and grievous economic injury” to its operations, an employer may refuse to reinstate certain highly-paid, salaried “key” employees. In order to do so, the employer must notify the employee in writing of his/her status as a “key” employee (as defined by FMLA), the reasons for denying job restoration, and provide the employee a reasonable opportunity to return to work after so notifying the employee.

Employee Notice
Eligible employees seeking to use FMLA leave may be required to provide:
• 30-day advance notice of the need to take FMLA leave when the need is foreseeable;
• notice “as soon as practicable” when the need to take FMLA leave is not foreseeable (“as soon as practicable” generally means at least verbal notice to the employer within one or two business days of learning of the need to take FMLA leave);
• sufficient information for the employer to understand that the employee needs leave for FMLA-qualifying reasons (the employee need not mention FMLA when requesting leave to meet this requirement, but may only explain why the leave is needed); and,
• where the employer was not made aware that an employee was absent for FMLA reasons and the employee wants the leave counted as FMLA leave, timely notice (generally within two business days of returning to work) that leave was taken for an FMLA-qualifying reason.
Employer Notices
Covered employers must take the following steps to provide information to employees about FMLA:
• post a notice approved by the Secretary of Labor (WH Publication 1420) explaining rights and responsibilities under FMLA;
• include information about employee rights and obligations under FMLA in employee handbooks or other written material, including Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs); or
• if handbooks or other written material do not exist, provide general written guidance about employee rights and obligations under FMLA whenever an employee requests leave (a copy of Fact Sheet No. 28 will fulfill this requirement); and
• provide a written notice designating the leave as FMLA leave and detailing specific expectations and obligations of an employee who is exercising his/her FMLA entitlements. The employer may use the “Employer Response to Employee Request for Family or Medical Leave” (optional form WH-381) to meet this requirement. This employer notice should be provided to the employee within one or two business days after receiving the employee’s notice of need for leave and include the following:
• that the leave will be counted against the employee’s annual FMLA leave entitlement;
• any requirements for the employee to furnish medical certification and the consequences of failing to do so;
• the employee’s right to elect to use accrued paid leave for unpaid FMLA leave and whether the employer will require the use of paid leave, and the conditions related to using paid leave;
• any requirement for the employee to make co-premium payments for maintaining group health insurance and the arrangement for making such payments;
• any requirement to present a fitness-for-duty certification before being restored to his/her job;
• rights to job restoration upon return from leave;
• employee’s potential liability for reimbursement of health insurance premiums paid by the employer during the leave if the employee fails to return to work after taking FMLA leave; and
• whether the employee qualifies as a “key” employee and the circumstances under which the employee may not be restored to his or her job following leave.
Unlawful Acts
FMLA makes it unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of any right provided by this law. It is also unlawful for an employer to discharge or discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice, or because of involvement in any proceeding, related to FMLA.
Employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, such as hiring, promotions, or disciplinary actions; nor can FMLA leave be counted under “no fault” attendance policies.
Enforcement
FMLA is enforced by the Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Employment Standards Administration. This agency investigates complaints of violations. If violations cannot be satisfactorily resolved, the Department may bring action in court to compel compliance.
An eligible employee may bring a private civil action against an employer for violations. An employee is not required to file a complaint with the Wage and Hour Division prior to bringing such action.
Other Provisions
Some special rules apply to employees of local education agencies. Generally, these rules provide for FMLA leave to be taken in blocks of time when the leave is needed intermittently or when leave is required near the end of a school term (semester).
Several States and other jurisdictions also have family or medical leave laws. If both the Federal law and a State law apply to an employer’s operations, an employee is entitled to the most generous benefit provided under either law.
Employers may also provide family and medical leave that is more generous than the FMLA leave requirements.
The FMLA does not modify or affect any Federal or State law which prohibits discrimination.
Questions and Answers
Q: How much leave am I entitled to under FMLA?
If you are an “eligible” employee, you are entitled to 12 weeks of leave for certain family and medical reasons during a 12-month period.
Q: How is the 12-month period calculated under FMLA?
Employers may select one of four options for determining the 12-month period:
• the calendar year;
• any fixed 12-month “leave year” such as a fiscal year, a year required by State law, or a year starting on the employee’s “anniversary” date;
• the 12-month period measured forward from the date any employee’s first FMLA leave begins; or
• a “rolling” 12-month period measured backward from the date an employee uses FMLA leave.
Q: Does the law guarantee paid time off?
No. The FMLA only requires unpaid leave. However, the law permits an employee to elect, or the employer to require the employee, to use accrued paid leave, such as vacation or sick leave, for some or all of the FMLA leave period. When paid leave is substituted for unpaid FMLA leave, it may be counted against the 12-week FMLA leave entitlement if the employee is properly notified of the designation when the leave begins.
Q: Does workers’ compensation leave count against an employee’s FMLA leave entitlement?
It can. FMLA leave and workers’ compensation leave can run together, provided the reason for the absence is due to a qualifying serious illness or injury and the employer properly notifies the employee in writing that the leave will be counted as FMLA leave.
Q: Can the employer count leave taken due to pregnancy complications against the 12 weeks of FMLA leave for the birth and care of my child?
Yes. An eligible employee is entitled to a total of 12 weeks of FMLA leave in a 12-month period. If the employee has to use some of that leave for another reason, including a difficult pregnancy, it may be counted as part of the 12-week FMLA leave entitlement.
Q: Can the employer count time on maternity leave or pregnancy disability leave as FMLA leave?
Yes. Pregnancy disability leave or maternity leave for the birth of a child would be considered qualifying FMLA leave for a serious health condition and may be counted in the 12 weeks of leave so long as the employer properly notifies the employee in writing of the designation.
Q: If an employer fails to tell employees that the leave is FMLA leave, can the employer count the time they have already been off against the 12 weeks of FMLA leave?
In most situations, the employer cannot count leave as FMLA leave retroactively. Remember, the employee must be notified in writing that an absence is being designated as FMLA leave. If the employer was not aware of the reason for the leave, leave may be designated as FMLA leave retroactively only while the leave is in progress or within two business days of the employee’s return to work.
Q: Who is considered an immediate “family member” for purposes of taking FMLA leave?
An employee’s spouse, children (son or daughter), and parents are immediate family members for purposes of FMLA. The term “parent” does not include a parent “in-law.” The terms son or daughter do not include individuals age 18 or over unless they are “incapable of self-care” because of a mental or physical disability that limits one or more of the “major life activities” as those terms are defined in regulations issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA).
Q: May I take FMLA leave for visits to a therapist, if my doctor prescribes the therapy?
Yes. FMLA permits you to take leave to receive “continuing treatment by a health care provider,” which can include recurring absences for therapy treatments such as those ordered by a doctor for physical therapy after a hospital stay, or for treatment of severe arthritis.
Q: Which employees are eligible to take FMLA leave?
Employees are eligible to take FMLA leave if they have worked for their employer for at least 12 months, and have worked for at least 1,250 hours over the previous 12 months, and work at a location where at least 50 employees are employed by the employer within 75 miles.
Q: Do the 12 months of service with the employer have to be continuous or consecutive?
No. The 12 months do not have to be continuous or consecutive; all time worked for the employer is counted.
Q: Do the 1,250 hours include paid leave time or other absences from work?
No. The 1,250 hours include only those hours actually worked for the employer. Paid leave and unpaid leave, including FMLA leave, are not included.
Q: How do I determine if I have worked 1,250 hours in a 12-month period?
Your individual record of hours worked would be used to determine whether 1,250 hours had been worked in the 12 months prior to the commencement of FMLA leave. As a rule of thumb, the following may be helpful for estimating whether this test for eligibility has been met:
• 24 hours worked in each of the 52 weeks of the year; or
• over 104 hours worked in each of the 12 months of the year; or
• 40 hours worked per week for more than 31 weeks (over seven months) of the year.
Q: Do I have to give my employer my medical records for leave due to a serious health condition?
No. You do not have to provide medical records. The employer may, however, request that, for any leave taken due to a serious health condition, you provide a medical certification confirming that a serious health condition exists.
Q: Can my employer require me to return to work before I exhaust my leave?
Subject to certain limitations, your employer may deny the continuation of FMLA leave due to a serious health condition if you fail to fulfill any obligations to provide supporting medical certification. The employer may not, however, require you to return to work early by offering you a light duty assignment.
Q: Are there any restrictions on how I spend my time while on leave?
Employers with established policies regarding outside employment while on paid or unpaid leave may uniformly apply those policies to employees on FMLA leave. Otherwise, the employer may not restrict your activities. The protections of FMLA will not, however, cover situations where the reason for leave no longer exists, where the employee has not provided required notices or certifications, or where the employee has misrepresented the reason for leave.
Q: Can my employer make inquiries about my leave during my absence?
Yes, but only to you. Your employer may ask you questions to confirm whether the leave needed or being taken qualifies for FMLA purposes, and may require periodic reports on your status and intent to return to work after leave. Also, if the employer wishes to obtain another opinion, you may be required to obtain additional medical certification at the employer’s expense, or recertification during a period of FMLA leave. The employer may have a health care provider representing the employer contact your health care provider, with your permission, to clarify information in the medical certification or to confirm that it was provided by the health care provider. The inquiry may not seek additional information regarding your health condition or that of a family member.
Q: Can my employer refuse to grant me FMLA leave?
If you are an “eligible” employee who has met FMLA’s notice and certification requirements (and you have not exhausted your FMLA leave entitlement for the year), you may not be denied FMLA leave.
Q: Will I lose my job if I take FMLA leave?
Generally, no. It is unlawful for any employer to interfere with or restrain or deny the exercise of any right provided under this law. Employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions; nor can FMLA leave be counted under “no fault” attendance policies. Under limited circumstances, an employer may deny reinstatement to work – but not the use of FMLA leave – to certain highly-paid, salaried (“key”) employees.
Q: Are there other circumstances in which my employer can deny me FMLA leave or reinstatement to my job?
In addition to denying reinstatement in certain circumstances to “key” employees, employers are not required to continue FMLA benefits or reinstate employees who would have been laid off or otherwise had their employment terminated had they continued to work during the FMLA leave period as, for example, due to a general layoff.
Employees who give unequivocal notice that they do not intend to return to work lose their entitlement to FMLA leave.
Employees who are unable to return to work and have exhausted their 12 weeks of FMLA leave in the designated “12 month period” no longer have FMLA protections of leave or job restoration.
Under certain circumstances, employers who advise employees experiencing a serious health condition that they will require a medical certificate of fitness for duty to return to work may deny reinstatement to an employee who fails to provide the certification, or may delay reinstatement until the certification is submitted.
Q: Can my employer fire me for complaining about a violation of FMLA?
No. Nor can the employer take any other adverse employment action on this basis. It is unlawful for any employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee for opposing a practice made unlawful under FMLA.
Q: Does an employer have to pay bonuses to employees who have been on FMLA leave?
The FMLA requires that employees be restored to the same or an equivalent position. If an employee was eligible for a bonus before taking FMLA leave, the employee would be eligible for the bonus upon returning to work. The FMLA leave may not be counted against the employee. For example, if an employer offers a perfect attendance bonus and the employee has not missed any time prior to taking FMLA leave, the employee would still be eligible for the bonus upon returning from FMLA leave.
On the other hand, FMLA does not require that employees on FMLA leave be allowed to accrue benefits or seniority. For example, an employee on FMLA leave might not have sufficient sales to qualify for a bonus. The employer is not required to make any special accommodation for this employee because of FMLA. The employer must, of course, treat an employee who has used FMLA leave at least as well as other employees on paid and unpaid leave (as appropriate) are treated.]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of Edwards Law Group LLC</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[ESI Litigation Hold Procedures]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2020/11/esi-litigation-hold-procedures/" />
            <id>https://www.tdemadison.com/?p=46332</id>
            <updated>2024-07-16T15:44:53Z</updated>
            <published>2020-11-12T10:16:17Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[It is very important to initiate a “litigation hold” when you have reason to believe that your client might be sued. This is the first line of defense to spoliation claims. A sample litigation hold directive is provided below: PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION NOTICE – The information in this correspondence, including all attachments thereto, is considered ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED AND…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2020/11/esi-litigation-hold-procedures/"><![CDATA[It is very important to initiate a “litigation hold” when you have reason to believe that your client might be sued. This is the first line of defense to spoliation claims. A sample litigation hold directive is provided below:

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION
NOTICE – The information in this correspondence, including all attachments thereto, is considered ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL and is intended only for the use of the individual(s) named above. Any unintended recipient is hereby notified that any disclosures, reproduction, use or distribution of such information is prohibited.
Re: [Short description of lawsuit or dispute to frame scope].
1. Retention/Collection of Documents
This message is being sent to you because you may have possession and/or knowledge of the existence of documents relevant to the above lawsuit involving the company. This written notice is to ensure that all relevant documents have been searched for and collected. As used in this notice, the terms “document,” “data” and “information” are used in the broadest sense and apply not only to paper documents or communications. Documents and information, in whatever form, that is relevant to this matter must be retained and preserved. You must continue to preserve all paper and electronic communication until you have received written notice that this litigation hold has been released.
Accordingly, please review the description of documents set forth below, and if you have possession or control of, or know of the existence of, any responsive documents, whether in hard copy or electronic form, please follow the instructions provided below for getting a copy of the documents into the hands of the company’s lawyers.
We have an obligation to maintain and preserve all documents and records, including electronic information, such as e-mail files, relating to the lawsuit. Please, therefore, locate and retain all records and files and documents that relate to [the lawsuit and/or the incident and/or the transaction, etc.]. The failure to adequately preserve information could result not only in the loss of information that could hurt or help the company’s legal position, but could also result in court-ordered sanctions such as default, imposition of financial penalties or could form the basis of a claim for spoliation of evidence. Therefore, it is imperative that anyone who has control over potentially relevant information is aware of the need to preserve it and that the company implement measures to prevent the destruction or spoliation of electronic data. As a first step, the company must immediately suspend the deletion, overwriting or any other policies or practices that may destroy electronically stored information that is relevant to his lawsuit. If you have any doubt about whether to retain any documents or information, you must preserve and retain the information until instructed otherwise.
THIS NOTICE SUPERCEDES ANY AND ALL EXISTING COMPANY DOCUMENT RETENTION POLICIES. DOCUMENTS IN ANY WAY RELEVANT TO THIS CASE MUST BE RETAINED.
If you know of other company employees who were involved in any way in [the lawsuit and/or the incident and/or the transaction, etc.] or who has had contact with the Company concerning such matters, please send me an email with their names.
If anyone affiliated with [opposing party] or its outside law firm [list firm name] speaks to you about this lawsuit, do not answer any questions that might be asked or provide any information to such individual. Please contact me immediately, should you receive such a telephone call or personal contact. Similarly, if you become aware that one of the Company’s customers has been contacted by [opposing party] or its outside law firm [list firm name] regarding this lawsuit, please contact me immediately.
2. Documents
At the present time, we do not know all of the documents that may exist that must be maintained for this lawsuit. However, at a minimum, please search for and maintain the following:
[list]
3. Collection Guidelines
In responding to the above, please review the files and records over which you have control to identify the existence of responsive documents. Each and every likely location should be searched, including:
File drawers
Desk and office drawers
Personal files/computers at home
Office computers and laptops
 Active emails
 Emails in folders
 Attachments to emails
 Documents on hard drives
 Documents on portable media, including floppy disks, CD’s, memory sticks.
Servers
 If you have responsive hard copy documents, please put them in a folder labeled “Documents of [insert your name here].” Please copy documents in the manner in which they are kept in your files, and please copy the file folder labels, if any, of the folders that documents may be maintained in.
 Please supply electronic documents in electronic form. Please do not print them out. If you have responsive electronic documents on the hard drive of your personal computer, please put those files only on a disk, CD or zip disk labeled “Documents of [insert your name here]” and put the disk, CD or zip disk in a similarly labeled folder.
 In undertaking this exercise, no files should be deleted (paper, electronic, or otherwise).
 Proprietary Information and Company Official Information must be produced. Identify such information in accordance with its proper status.
 It does not matter how old or recent the document is, as we are required to produce all responsive material.
 If a responsive document is extremely difficult to supply, please contact me directly to discuss the logistics and the reasons you believe it would be difficult to provide the entire document.
 If you believe that you once had responsive electronic documents, but no longer possess them because such documents have been lost or deleted (either from your computer or from the Company’s servers), please contact me directly and immediately to discuss whether such documents can be recovered. This is extremely time sensitive in view of the recycling of the Company’s electronic information back-up tapes.
 Please hand deliver the folders to ______________________________ or _______________________, preferably no later than the end of business on [INSERT DATE].
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me directly at [telephone number and email address]. Please reply promptly to acknowledge that you have read and understood the preservation obligation stated in this litigation hold notice.]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of Edwards Law Group LLC</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[Introduction to ESI Part I]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2020/10/introduction-to-esi-part-i/" />
            <id>https://www.tdemadison.com/?p=46324</id>
            <updated>2024-06-13T09:40:22Z</updated>
            <published>2020-10-31T09:16:14Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[The proliferation of electronic data has dramatically changed the landscape of civil litigation.  According to a University of California study, “93% of all information generated from 1999 was generated in digital form, on computers.  Only 7% of information originated in other media, such as paper.”[i]  As a result of these developments, almost all documentary evidence that is relevant to the…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.tdemadison.com/blog/2020/10/introduction-to-esi-part-i/"><![CDATA[The proliferation of electronic data has dramatically changed the landscape of civil litigation.  According to a University of California study, “93% of all information generated from 1999 was generated in digital form, on computers.  Only 7% of information originated in other media, such as paper.”<a href="#_edn1" name="_ednref1">[i]</a>  As a result of these developments, almost all documentary evidence that is relevant to the outcome of a lawsuit is generated by computer technology.  emedia, cloud storage and other internet technology which places some information in plain view for the world to see.  The law continues to adjust to these technologies, changing the way lawyers approach issues surrounding the preservation, production and admissibility of electronically stored information.

The explosion in computer generated information directly impacts discovery practice, trial strategy and our assumptions about litigation.  This is because computer generated data has many unique characteristics that are not always taken into consideration in traditional approaches to discovery and trial practice.  Unlike a banker’s box full of documents that are static, readily identifiable and usually kept in one location, electronically stored information can be voluminous, dispersed within many specific locations and, in most cases, accessible and open to human intervention.  This central feature of electronically stored data- “untestability”- requires special emphasis from the preservation stage through the production stage, raising direct questions regarding authenticity and admissibility from very early in the lawsuit.

The first step in developing an ESI-based a discovery strategy requires a full appreciation of how electronic data is much different than its copy, paper counterpart.  As a starting point, electronically stored documents often reside in computer systems that are not secured or protected.  Unlike a paper document, which is usually easily identified by reference to a signature or other unique characteristic, it can be very difficult to show that electronically stored information is truly authentic.  This is because multiple users often have access to the document over a span of time, making it very difficult to determine whether the information within the document is being produced in its “original” state.  Consequently, ESI is often difficult to authenticate without an unbroken chain of preservation or sufficient proof of “system integrity” that supports the proponent’s representation of authenticity.  This places a significant burden on the proponent of the admissibility of electronic data- one that can be difficult to sustain.

The shift to electronic data has critical implications for the litigator, his strategy and the costs incurred in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit.  Today, people do not create documents when they use a computer.  The “documents” are created by a computer that stores and processes information that is transferred into a usable medium, such as a writing.  The focus for the lawyer is not the document but rather, the information itself as it existed in its natural or original state and, then, at a specific point in time.  This can change behind the scenes, sometimes automatically, even without a writing.

There are other features of ESI that must be taken into account when preparing an ESI discovery plan.  For example, electronic data is often stored in different formats in different media by different authors and contribution.  Given the volume of data that is often involved, cooperation is essential to manage these distinctions in a meaningful way.  When litigation is foreseeable, counsel and her client must take specific, concrete steps to preserve electronic data and maintain its integrity until the matter is concluded.  Following that, counsel must navigate the meet and confer process with opposing counsel to secure agreements regarding the form of production and the preservation of privileged or confidential information.  Protocols should be established to ensure that information is reviewed and processed in a reliable, defensible fashion.

Not surprisingly, the questions of cost and efficiency surfaced immediately as a central issue in many cases involving complex or voluminous electronic data.  In many cases, costs associated primarily with the review process soared well beyond the value and significance of the litigation that prompted it.  Litigants and courts naturally wrestled with a difficult cost/benefit calculus, forcing renewed emphasis on the burdens associated with discovery that is not narrowly focused or targeted on the discovery of necessary, admissible evidence.

This debate continues.  Today, counsel must be particularly sensitive to questions concerning proportionality, a critical precept of discovery law that ultimately determines who must pay for the review and production of data through a “cost-shifting” analysis. Finally, counsel must consider questions regarding the admissibility of electronic data from the earliest stages of the lawsuit, both defensively and proactively, with an eye towards authentication and other traditional safeguards of evidence law, including privilege.  Cooperation between the parties and active judicial involvement is necessary for this process to unfold in a meaningful way.

They e-discovery process can be broken down into interlocking pieces that are is designed to insure the integrity of documents that are admitted at trial in an efficient, proportional fashion.  To accomplish this task, it is first necessary to define ESI and to outline the key differences between electronic data and paper documents, which often define the process in critical ways.  This topic is next..

<a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1">[i]</a> In re Bristol-Myers SQUIBBS Securities Litigation, 205 F.R.D. 437, 440 n.2 (D.N.J. 2002).]]></content>
						        </entry>
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